

CURRENT *History* A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER 1966

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OR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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CURRENT History

SEPTEMBER, 1966

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In this issue, seven articles explore the situation in China today, with six studies of the mainland and one of Taiwan. The introductory author, tracing China's recent history, notes that today "China is strong, and feared, and modernized to the point where it counts in the military calculations of outside powers; these are the achievements of the Communist government, and they win it the widest support."

The Origin of the Chinese Revolution

By C. P. FITZGERALD

Professor of Far Eastern History, Australian National University

WHY WAS THERE a Chinese revolution? How did it all begin? Above all, why has it resulted in a Communist regime? These questions are raised by those who begin to take an interest in the part that China plays in today's world. They express the bewilderment of a generation which has until recently been taught certain dogmas about China—insofar as it was taught anything at all. "The Chinese are the most conservative of peoples with an unchanging history of four thousand years"; "the Chinese are a nation of individualists, keen traders and devoted to personal gain and private business." These were accepted as established truths that could not be wrong, or inadequate, or only half true. So it followed that the fact that China had experienced a deep and far-reaching social revolution and had abolished the economic system of free enterprise must be due to some agency beyond China itself—and the obvious bogey was international communism.

Today, it is all too clear that international communism is just as divided and diversified as international democracy; there is Russian

communism, Chinese communism, Yugoslav communism—and perhaps a Rumanian variety is about to emerge. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at China itself, its history and tradition, to find the causes of these great events within Chinese society. Any such examination will at once reveal that the old dogmas are at best half truths: China had not so long a history as four thousand years; three thousand would be an extreme limit. Nor has that history been unchanging. Certain forms remained; underneath many very real changes of content occurred. The old Chinese literate class invented the myth of unchanging China, and imposed it upon the Western scholars of an earlier generation. They had been taught to look upon a legendary golden age in the remote past as the ideal society; all later developments merely marked a decline in virtue and perfection. So the least change was the most desirable; to admit or look for evidence of change was perverse and subversive.

Yet it was precisely this attitude of mind which was the first cause of the ultimate revolution. Under the Manchu Dynasty,

traditional and psychological restrictions on progressive thinking were so powerful that most members of the ruling class were unable to meet the challenge that the new contact with the Western world imposed. They failed to exclude the West, as at first they hoped to do. Then they failed to accept the new knowledge that the Western peoples brought—thus taking a course exactly opposite to that of their contemporaries in Japan. Finally, they repressed and ignored all elements in China itself which were willing to learn and anxious to adapt. By the end of the nineteenth century, the failure to resist Western encroachment or to accept Western modernization made a revolution the only alternative to the collapse of the state and the partition of China among the Western powers—an outcome many then believed imminent and inevitable.

The generation which forged the revolution, the men who came of age about the turn of the century, had been preceded by a smaller group who had first by their writings and teaching prepared the ground. In the second half of the nineteenth century, such men as Yen Fu had already translated important English and French books and taught an ever-growing circle that only by understanding and accepting the new values of science and democracy could China be saved, only thus could China find the secret of "Wealth and Power," which Yen Fu saw as the key attributes of the aggressive Western nations. In many ways, every successive generation of reformers or revolutionaries has been dedicated to this same search. Methods have changed; objectives have remained about the same. The aim has been to rebuild the power and strength of the Chinese state; whether it was to be an empire, a republic, or a Communist regime was in reality secondary to this supreme purpose—a method, rather than a goal.

THE KUOMINTANG

The various phases of the revolution show clearly how easily an outworn or ineffective system was discarded, how few fought for lost causes, how quickly the majority of the

nation rallied to the new hope. The empire fell in 1911 and few were found to regret it. The republic which succeeded it was from the first a failure, since no one in China was acquainted with the working of parliamentary or congressional democracy, and the country lacked the long established legal system on which such political forms must be based. China accepted a new idea in 1926, the "Party State," under the guidance of a single party which was to educate the people to a future ability to practice democracy, but which for many years kept them in tutelage.

Once more the nation was to be disappointed. The Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, which inherited the leadership from the collapsing early republic, did indeed put an end to the worst excesses and fragmentation of the country by warlords ruling the provinces. But it followed a strongly nationalist foreign policy, alienating friends and exacerbating enemies without tackling the underlying causes of China's continuing weakness. No social reforms to relieve peasant poverty, end landlord exploitation, or encourage the spread of modern industry and the development of China's untapped resources were undertaken. The Nationalists and their leader, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, held that military solutions must come first. The dissident warlords in the outer provinces, the rising of the Communist Party within the country, and the danger of foreign—particularly Japanese—aggression, preoccupied their minds. But without the development of its own resources, without a solution to the evils of the outdated land tenure system, China could not generate the industrial strength and social stability needed to restore internal peace or fend off foreign attack.

The Nationalists thus largely wasted the years of their greatest power, from 1927 to 1937, in mistaken policies that solved no problems. Frequent, costly and ineffective campaigns to suppress the Communist movement which had taken root in the distressed rural regions of southern China occupied the energies of the army and the leader, to the exclusion of more vital defense against the rising aggression of Japan. The nation

began to lose patience; in the end, early in 1937, a movement of protest which ranged from university students to mutinous armies and their commanders finally forced Chiang Kai-shek (a prisoner of these mutineers at Sian) to abandon his ineffective campaigns against the Communists, make an agreement with them, and turn, too late, to the defense of the country against Japan.

It was clearly too late, for when the major Japanese invasion came later that same year (1937) China had no adequate military forces to resist. The regular armies fought well, as at Shanghai, but could not maintain their positions in the face of Japanese armament, Japanese control of the air, and exclusive domination of the seas. Huge areas of the richest provinces were overrun, and the government was forced ever further westward into the mountainous provinces which were the least developed and the most backward politically. Relying on the support of these regions and their dominant military landlord class, the Nationalist government in Chungking became reactionary, corrupt, inefficient and increasingly unpopular.

RISE OF COMMUNISM

Subsequently, the Nationalists had to meet not only the challenge of Japanese conquest but the internal competition of a new rival, the Communist Party. The rise of that party in China had been erratic. In 1921, very small groups of intellectuals met to form the Communist Party of China, which was at first wholly in the leading strings of the Russian Communist Party and Chinese leaders who had been trained in Moscow. The Party suffered from what Lenin has called "infantilism." It sought to foment a textbook revolution based on a class analysis derived from European models, with little relevance for Chinese realities. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the original leader of the revolution against the dynasty, and the founder of the Nationalist Party, had turned to Russia for the aid which the Western nations denied to him. He made an agreement which permitted the Chinese Communists to join the Nationalist Party as individuals working in common for

the overthrow of the despised warlord regime.

If Dr. Sun had lived, this alliance might conceivably have been viable. He died in 1925; thereafter, leadership of the Nationalists remained uncertain for some years, during which the campaign to eliminate the northern warlords was successfully conducted by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, greatly assisted by the revolutionary tactics of Communist rural agitators and cadres. But when Shanghai fell to this combination of military attack and revolutionary uprising, Chiang soon turned upon his Communist allies, led an extensive massacre of them and their supporters, founded his own right-wing Nationalist government at Nanking, and began a long series of campaigns to suppress the Communist movement. The Communists made many serious, almost fatal mistakes. They tried to capture large cities such as Ch'angsha and Canton, where "workers" would, they hoped, rally to their cause and give them massive support. But in that period there were few Chinese industrial workers and, although they lived in abject poverty and suffered from exploiting employers, they had neither the will nor the strength to sustain an armed revolution. The attacks on the cities were disastrously repulsed.

The Communists, driven into the wild mountains of southern China, changed their policy—and their leadership. The Moscow-trained young men who had led the party from secret headquarters in Shanghai were replaced in control of the field by men with more direct experience of the Chinese countryside. One of these, the military leader, was Chu Teh, a former warlord officer; the other was Mao Tse-tung, country born himself, a Communist since the foundation of the party, a writer, politician, agitator, organizer and original thinker. Under their leadership, the party turned from attempts to capture cities, relying on "workers," to the more rewarding policy of winning peasant support by land distribution, expropriation of private land holdings, and guerrilla warfare. It was at this time and in these circumstances that Mao worked out his strategy of "surrounding the cities with the countryside" and other

precepts of guerrilla warfare that were later so successfully employed against the Japanese invaders. The period of the "Kiangsi Soviet," from 1928 to 1935, was thus of decisive importance in building the Communist Party and developing its new policies. This period ended when the Nationalist armies, advised by high German officers, blockaded the Kiangsi region and forced the Communists to undertake their celebrated Long March, by which the whole Communist army and its dependents crossed the length and breadth of China, more than 3,000 miles, to establish itself in the northern part of Shensi province, a remote region, backing onto the Inner Mongolian steppe. It was during this march that Mao Tse-tung was elected chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, a position he has held ever since.

Two years after the Communists had settled in the Yen-an district of north Shensi, Nationalist forces mutinied at Sian. Chiang had ordered them to attack Yen-an; instead they forced the captive Nationalist leader to agree to end the civil war, and to unite with the Communists to resist Japanese aggression. Already the Japanese had seized Manchuria in 1931, and were in the process of taking the northern province of Hopei (in which Peking is situated). In July of that same year, 1937, the Japanese struck again, but this time there was no surrender and no temporary settlement. The war widened to engulf all China, and continued until the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, eight years later.

The Japanese invasion was the real cause of the later Communist victory. It destroyed the main strength of the Nationalist army, deprived that regime of control over the greater part of China, and failed to pacify the occupied countryside. The areas which the Japanese overran were infiltrated by guerrillas under Communist leadership; "liberated areas" came into existence, governed by the Communist regime from Yen-an; and these areas grew and spread. By August, 1945, when Japan surrendered, the whole rural region of North China—four or five major provinces—was effectively controlled

by the Communist regime, and no Nationalist forces or officials had been seen there for eight years.

DEFEAT FOR CHIANG

This was the background for the negotiations which United States General George Marshall undertook at President Harry S. Truman's request, to try to establish a coalition government that could rule all China, and avoid the imminent danger of another civil war. General Marshall failed in this attempt, as he rightly reported, because neither side trusted the other, and neither would make the concessions which alone could have established a joint regime. Chiang Kai-shek never intended to work with the Communists. The Communist Party would not give up the great measure of control it had secured in large parts of China, and the proposed reorganization of the armed forces under unified command was rendered impossible by mutual mistrust. Armed power was the only guarantee of political existence, as the Democratic League (a really democratic party of professional and academic classes) discovered. Lacking this power, they were persecuted and destroyed by the regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

General Marshall left China, and at once the civil war resumed. On paper, the Nationalists had overwhelming military superiority. They had sole command of the air. They were lavishly armed with American weapons, and their best divisions had been trained for modern war by American instructors. On the other hand, the Communists' experience of war was almost wholly guerrilla war. They had avoided major encounters with Japanese forces, but nonetheless dominated the countryside. The rule of the Nationalists had greatly deteriorated in the long period of retreat to the western provinces. Corruption and nepotism were rife, indeed gross. Inflation and mismanagement, often associated with corrupt practices and manipulation of exchange rates, had so weakened the economy that industry and legitimate commerce were at a standstill. The government ruled by force, using its secret police to

repress all criticism, constructive or hostile. The Chinese people, therefore, once more turned away from a government and a system which had failed and disappointed them. China was as weak and distracted as ever, even worse, for economic disasters added to the ruin of the widespread Japanese invasion had eliminated all but the corruptly acquired wealth of the small inner group of the Nationalist leadership. Men who had nothing to lose were not moved by fears of Communist expropriation.

The civil war was therefore disastrous to the Nationalist cause from the first. Land communications between Nanking and the isolated cities of the north were never restored. The Nationalists lost Manchuria, and then North China. In late 1948, the armies of Chiang Kai-shek suffered in central China the final catastrophe of the battle of Huai-Hai, named after the Huai River and the Lung Hai railway along which it was fought. Huge formations surrendered; the main force was surrounded and capitulated; the power of the Nationalists was destroyed. The Chinese soldier, however well trained and armed, refused to fight for a cause which seemed doomed, and which promised him so little. The Communists won not because any large number of people understood their program or supported Communist ideology, but because they despaired of the corruption and misrule of the Nationalists. Anything seemed better, and the nation was prepared to give the Communists the benefit of the doubt. During the war with Japan and the civil war thereafter, the Communists had acquired a good reputation for maintaining discipline in their forces, treating the peasantry well, paying for their needs, refraining from looting and corruption. These were virtues all too rarely, if ever, found among their Nationalist opponents.

COMMUNIST SUCCESSES

In many ways the Communists, once in power after 1949, fulfilled old hopes. They restored order, repressed and eliminated banditry and maintained firm discipline in their own forces. Looting and oppression by

the army became unknown. After eight years of disruption, communications were swiftly restored, and then extended. The fantastic inflation of the last days of the Nationalists was brought under control, then halted. A new and stable currency restored the possibility of normal commerce. Industry was able to resume operations and gradually undertake new development. In the first years of the Communist regime this work of mere salvage, which any competent government must perform, was unreservedly praised and welcomed by the Chinese people. This was a most important factor in establishing the regime. People who saw so much necessary good work in progress (which no previous regime had been able or willing to undertake) were ready to reserve judgement on aspects of the new policies which they did not like or understand. Moreover, if China was now at loggerheads with her late ally, the United States, most people in China did not feel that this was the fault of their own regime; on the contrary, they were led to support it from feelings of patriotism. Continued United States protection of Chiang Kai-shek in his retreat in Taiwan seemed to suggest that the United States was opposed to all that the new regime was doing in China—and most of that activity was entirely welcome to the Chinese people. Any nation which favored the detested fallen Nationalist regime was certain to be regarded as the enemy of the Chinese people. This was a tragic misunderstanding, which still persists.

It seemed to the great mass of the Chinese people that whatever else the Communists might do, or plan to do, they had in fact

(Continued on page 178)

C. P. FitzGerald lived in China from 1923 to 1929, and later from 1946 to 1950; he visited again in 1956 and 1958. He is the author of *The Chinese View of Their Place in the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), *China: A Short Cultural History* (New York: Praeger, 1962), and *A Concise History of East Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1966), among other works.

In analyzing the meaning of the recent "cultural revolution" in Communist China, this authority finds, among other things, that "the leadership directing these events, over and above any question of internal differences, moved to show clearly that change, when it must come, must be in line with established policy and theory. . . ."

Peking's "Cultural Revolution"

By SHEN-YU DAI

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THE YEAR OF THE HORSE has not proven to be a very smoothly running year for Peking. From its beginning, in January, 1966, Mao Tse-tung, Peking's leader, stayed out of public view, hence causing speculation that his "aura of infallibility" had been eroded by policy reverses; that he might well have been seriously ill or even dead. Then earthquakes rocked North China, with extensive damage reported. Also, Peking became the central issue of a heated debate in the United States, to be followed only by much worse controversies and "struggles" within the mainland Chinese nation itself, producing "rumblings" that became plainly audible all over the world.¹

The year was to have signaled the start of the much belated third five-year plan but,

in the midst of the internal and external battle cries, observers have all but forgotten any positive implications for the Middle Kingdom. Cautious analysts expressed puzzlement; less restrained reporters made dire speculations. By the middle of July, the Chinese Communist regime had reportedly closed its doors, at least temporarily, to most categories of foreign visitors. Such events indicate that the Peking regime must be "in a state of precarious equilibrium," to say the least.² But, do they indicate that this is a real "power struggle"? a battle for the succession? or a form of social change? policy emphasis? administrative shift?³

To answer these questions, we must look back to see what the Chinese Communists have been trying to do in the 1960's. While up to the much berated "great leap forward" of the late 1950's and even immediately thereafter, the Chinese Communists spoke constantly of the "three red banners of the General Line for Socialist Construction, the Great Leap Forward and People's Commune," the natural and human disasters of 1959-1962 gradually relegated these "red banners" to the background. After this, a new cry was heard for another "Three Major Revolutionary Movements," namely, "the class struggle, the struggle for production, and scientific experiment."⁴ These movements have served as fountainheads for all that

¹ Prompted by curiosity about such matters, this writer has prepared the present study with the benefit, at least partly, of two existing research grants, one from his own Colorado State University and one from the Social Science Foundation, Graduate School of International Studies, Denver University, for which he wishes to express his gratitude.

² According to Lucian W. Pye, in "Coming Dilemmas for China's Leaders," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1966, p. 391.

³ For one view, see "Unity against Imperialism—Historical Mission of Asian and African Writers," *Peking Review* (hereafter *PR*), July 8, 1966.

⁴ See "Throw Yourselves into Three Revolutionary Movements and Become Staunch Revolutionary Successors," in *Selections from China Mainland Magazines*, No. 446 (August, 1964), American Consulate General (Hong Kong).

has happened since and for much of what will be going on in mainland China for some time to come.

To be sure "class struggle" and "struggle for production" are concepts and guidelines intrinsic in Communist ideology and programs. But they have gained new causation and new content from the "leap" and "post-leap" developments. The call for "scientific experiment" is not too hard to understand in view of Peking's three successful nuclear tests to date. But this, too, is not a "technical" trend by itself, with its own momentum or source of power apart from other social and political developments. Rather, it is, like the other movements, an integral part of what has now become known as Peking's "cultural revolution," which includes a new rectification campaign in literature, art and education as well.⁵

THE CONTINUING CLASS STRUGGLE

Take "class struggle" for example. The 1959–1962 setbacks suffered by the Peking regime did not, as expected, augur well for the Communist Party (C.C.P.) and the leaders in power. "In these few years of economic difficulties," observed the *Peking Review* recently (June 17, 1966), "monsters had come out of their hiding places one after

another." "The offensive of the reactionary bourgeoisie against the Party and socialism reached a degree of utmost fury" in the fields of philosophy, economics, history, literature, art, and education, culminating in journalism, where a "most reactionary and fanatical anti-Party gang," with its "many bases—newspapers, magazines, forums and publishing organizations," emerged. Although Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee of the C.C.P. did not open their counterattack until November, 1965, and only brought the matter to worldwide attention during the spring and summer of 1966, this "great socialist cultural revolution" had its deeper roots and longer history in the immediate past.

To begin with, the 1956–1957 "Bloom and Contend" campaign,⁶ was never completely abandoned; it recurred time and again after the "leap" period, albeit in a more subdued manner. Even though those designated as "rightists," plus the "war criminals" of earlier (Kuomintang) and later (Tibet) days, were and are still being released one group after another, the 1959 party decision to punish them left its scars and raw wounds. These erupted directly into what has become known as the Teng T'o-Wu Han-Liao Mo-sha case—a case involving veiled criticism of the Peking regime and leadership, especially as to personnel policy, and an officially inspired response from fellow intellectuals and party comrades. The punishment meted out to the offenders chiefly affected their direct superior official and comrade, Peking's Mayor, and party committee first secretary, P'eng Chen.⁷

The "cultural revolution," however, was aimed more at "bourgeois" and "feudal" ideas, than at particular men as such. Hence, antiparty criticisms and inuendos were not the only targets. Also opposed were "old ideas," "outmoded habits and customs," "superstitions," and "feudal morals" in general. The officially directed campaign, in this particular regard, was to help the people "break away from the fetters" of such "feudal culture" and replace it with a "new socialist culture."⁸ Or, where "replacement" was not easy, the

⁵ News was made by Premier Chou En-lai's statement on this "cultural revolution" while in Bucharest; see *The New York Times*, June 19, 1966. Cf. "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking, Actively Participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution," *PR*, April 29, 1966.

⁶ Also known as the Hundred Flowers movement, an effort by Mao and the party to conciliate the Chinese intellectuals.

⁷ The criticism was expressed in the form of devious protest and admonition regarding officials supposedly dismissed by former "Emperors," in "historical" plays and essays. The culprits, despite their self-criticisms and self-criticisms of the newspapers and journal publishing their writings, the *Peking Daily*, *Peking Evening News*, and *Frontline*, were themselves dismissed from office. See a most revealing article by their original attacker, Yao Wu-yuan, entitled "On 'Three Family Village,'" in *PR*, May 27, 1966; also Donald T. Munro, "Dissent in Communist China: The Current Anti-Intellectual Campaign in Perspective," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), June 1, 1966.

⁸ See, in particular, "Replace Old Feudal Culture with New Socialist Culture," *Survey of China Mainland Press* (S.C.M.P.), No. 3346 (November 12, 1964).

"masses" were urged to recognize the non-proletarian "class character" and pretentious mein of the "ancients," such as Confucius, and refrain from "modernizing" their ideas.⁹

And even when the target was men, the intellectuals and "outmoded" people were not alone; the Communist authorities also launched drives against "U.S.-Chiang agents" "saboteurs," "bandits," commando raiders, potential defectors and escapees, and made efforts to win over potential dissenters from the Nationalist side. Hence, former Nationalist Acting President Li Tsung-jen, upon returning to the mainland in July, 1965, provided Peking with a most welcome propaganda victory.¹⁰

UNITED FRONT WORK

More significantly, Peking's "class struggle" was not a one-sided negative affair. An effort was also exerted to strengthen the party's own ranks and control, including that over the army and auxiliary political organizations; to effect "socialist education" and assimilation of susceptible segments of the population; and to improve the conditions of, and relations with, minority groups and border areas of the country.

To strengthen the political and military arms of the regime and, as a matter of fact, to do everything "better," the panacea was always a mass movement, constantly kept alive, to "study the thought of Chairman Mao," whose works were extensively and continually published and publicized in all national languages, including braille for the blind, and through all channels, organizations, units and media and at all locations. The People's Liberation Army, under Minister of Defense Lin Piao, rendered a special service by propagating Mao's thinking and

methods through "political work conferences" and "study movements" which, with the help of the party and government, were spread to all mass organizations and professional and political groups. The militia units, the Young Communist League and Young Pioneers organizations, government agencies and departments, schools and trade unions, industry and communications circles, finance and trade, agriculture and forestry, physical culture and sports, all were coaxed to "learn from the P.L.A."

The party, on its own, stressed the Maoist approach of "investigation and study" in practical work; reinforced its control mechanisms throughout the hierarchy in terms of revitalizing "democratic centralism"; overhauled its committee leadership at the *hsien* level; and, in a word, strengthened its "fighting stamina" as a whole. The Young Communist League was directed to expand its membership carefully. The Young Pioneers now number well over fifty million throughout the nation.

A "socialist education" campaign during the years aimed at making proletarians not only out of all workers, peasants and soldiers, but also out of all youths and children in and out of school, urban or rural, and all bourgeois intellectuals and others outside the pale of the party and its auxiliary organizations. A Spare-time University of Marxism-Leninism, for instance, was set up in the Peking Normal University—"a school within a school"—for both teachers and students. Part-work (farming) and part-study schools were also widely established in the countryside, where high school graduates and, in time, college graduates from the cities were urged to go, along with their teachers, professors, literary and art workers, scientists and technicians. All were encouraged to "face the countryside," to "go to the mountainous and remote regions" to achieve the dual capability of "mental" and "manual" labor. Some were persuaded to migrate there, as this would not, in the official explanation, be a "waste" but a "promotion" of their talent and a sure way of acquiring an education through "actual struggle," learning the proletarian viewpoint

⁹ "National Forums on Confucius" were held in 1961-62 and appraisals of the Chinese sage were given. To remove or replace the ancient concepts has proved to be a most exacting task for the Communists.

¹⁰ Gen. Li publicly admitted his own "mistakes" and praised the Peking regime's "achievements." See especially *Current Background* (hereafter cited as *CB*), No. 773 (October 14, 1965), events of July 20-August 20, September 22-December 2, 1965, American Consulate General (Hong Kong).

by becoming identified with the workers and peasants, and thus contributing toward the building of a "socialist new countryside." Latest reports indicate that over forty million such "intellectual youths" are already engaged in this type of "socialist education."

To "proletarianize" and revolutionize other segments of the population, "revolutionary reminiscences" by the veteran cadres of the "Long March" and anti-Japanese War days were extensively published and publicized, in folk manners such as story-telling, in every corner of the country and on every conceivable occasion. Implicitly and explicitly, every conceivable effort was made to raise a new "younger generation."

Attention was also paid to the different minorities in their border areas. Mao's works, and even the polemics on the international Communist movement, were made available to them in their own languages. Then, too, highways and railways were built, rivers "tamed," virgin lands reclaimed, their talents (including those of women) encouraged and employed (including in government positions), and their leaders and representatives often personally received by top personalities in Peking.¹¹

PRODUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC EXPERIMENT

This effort was of course aimed at helping "socialist construction" and "production," especially in the countryside, in the present "stage" of the revolution. The Communists, more than anything else, stressed "giving prominence to politics" even in the drive for production. It was intended, at this "stage," to uplift the "quality" of the people and products in question, having already emphasized "quantity" through extreme and extensive diligence in organization work. The devices for such qualitative uplifting often overlapped other drives and included continued ideological indoctrination and expanded education, continued political guidance and con-

trol, and technical training of the producers—mainly workers and peasants, but also soldiers. Continued assistance and reinforcement from previously "non-productive" ranks—students, teachers, scientists, technicians, and other intellectuals—were also called for, plus the mechanization and modernization of technical equipment and an extraordinary program of "scientific experiment."

In addition to the "spare-time education" programs, mobile libraries were provided, and publications increased. By 1964, housewives and rural youths were found ready for organized study of "Chairman Mao's works." Scientific, cultural, and health workers were called upon to "serve rural areas better." Simultaneously, party cadres were sent from higher to lower levels, especially where production work was known to be slow-moving; the number of political meetings was reduced; the production of more goods was called for. There were drives for more fertilizer and more technical equipment. "Specialists and peasants" were gathered together in conferences for greater output; "privately-run schools at various levels" were set up for the peasants to learn "culture and agricultural technique"; "new type academies" for training "farming technicians" were opened, and demonstration farms built. New improved and mechanized farm tools, at cut prices, were supplied and conferences on general "agricultural mechanization" and "technical transformation" convened. As a result, mechanized drainage and irrigation systems were claimed to have been extended to 90 per cent of China's counties, with local designs and homemade equipment. Science and technology films were widely shown to the peasants, and "agricultural scientists" and rural youths were all organized for "scientific experiment."

On the practical side and most typical of the "proletarian" approach, beginning in 1964, "poor and lower-middle peasants" were organized to supervise commune finance and production operations in order to avoid waste and increase "public accumulation." To reduce consumption, a birth control campaign, after political wavering in earlier years, was launched in earnest (1962 through 1965).

¹¹ In recent years Communist authorities have been trying to make show cases of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and, above all, Tibet, apparently in view of realities and developments immediately beyond the borders.

Early marriages were opposed, big families penalized, and planned childbirth conferences held (with "publicity, education, and technical guidance"). And, along with other "old ideas and practices," the traditional family and marriage system was subjected to renewed reform.

But most significant was the fact that the new campaign was for those who were "red" and those who were "expert" alike. With those who were "expert" (the intellectuals, scientists and technicians), in particular, a fresh air of "liberalization" was felt when, in 1961, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi told college graduates: "At present, we should stress the study of specialized studies. It is wrong for ordinary schools to devote so much time to political studies and to labor that they have to loosen their grip on specialized studies." "If we do not attach importance to the study of specialized subjects," he warned, "our country will remain always backward scientifically and culturally."¹²

This and other party and government directives led to a new upsurge of scientific and professional activity with societies and associations of all sorts mushrooming all over the country and professional forums, symposiums, conferences, congresses and annual meetings being held in the social and natural sciences, as well as in the humanities. Professors, teachers, technicians, and even peasants and workers, were encouraged to write books and papers; the motion picture industry, to produce more science films and dub more foreign science films; science societies, to publish more journals; students and ordinary people, to show more respect to scientists and tech-

nicians; and veteran scientists and technicians, to train more outstanding and promising young ones. More science schools, departments and classes were opened; museums established; research and experimental stations built; and mass experiments conducted. And, in addition, the city of Peking opened an imposing Hall of Science to symbolize and signify the importance of the movement.

For a while, men of know-how, and of letters, seemed very much in vogue. But, the "political essence" was not long forgotten in higher quarters. Soon, in 1964-1965, the questions of the danger of "blind faith in foreign technology" versus "self-reliance," and of the tendency of "bourgeois fame-and-wealth thinking" versus proletarian virtues, brought the wayward technicians back to the serious business of "class struggle" and "cultural revolution."¹³

"CULTURAL REVOLUTION": ITS MEANING?

What does all this mean? Is Peking facing a real crisis—an internal power struggle between the classes, between opposing forces, among the top leaders themselves? Or is the regime "plotting" something else?

The thing that triggered the speculation about the struggle or "purge" as indicative of a "coup" or "revolt"¹⁴ was, no doubt, the involvement of high-ranking leaders among the Communists themselves, like P'eng Chen, Teng T'o and then, later, the party's long-time propaganda chief, Lu Ting-yi.¹⁵ The tacit replacement or open attack upon these men naturally indicated that all was not tranquil in Peking, to say the least.

However, upon closer examination, one sees a more business-as-usual picture. Teng T'o, whose writings (together with those of non-Communist Vice Mayor Wu Han of Peking) incurred Mao's wrath and caused his replacement in the midst of the "cultural revolution" (dragging P'eng Chen with him), was not such an indispensable Communist leader to begin with. Further, P'eng and Lu did not appear to have been viciously "purged." P'eng, apparently still in his elective office as mayor (although perhaps at least temporarily out of decision-making func-

¹² S.C.M.P., No. 2581 (August 10, 1961).

¹³ See, in particular, "The Danger of Bourgeois Fame-and-Wealth Thinking to Scientific Undertaking," and "The Cult of Foreign Technology" discussions, in *ibid.*, Nos. 3334 (October 15, 1964), 3588 (November 13, 1965) and 3589 (November 28, 1965).

¹⁴ It is the Chinese Communists who used such terms, typically vituperative but "dialectical" in nature. See, especially, "Long Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," *PR*, June 17, 1966.

¹⁵ For recent and most useful biographies of these three "purged" Communist leaders, and others, see *Who's Who in Communist China* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1966).

tion), may have merely been taking the bureaucratic responsibility for the wrong-doing of his subordinates; there is no indication that he himself has said or done anything out of line in recent years.

As for Lu Ting-yi, his successor T'ao Chu had been a rising star in the party ranks for quite some time. As the campaign for the nation to "face the countryside" was being promoted, T'ao's background as a high-ranking cadre who had previously been "sent down" to the countryside may not have been irrelevant. Lu's long service on the job could have been another reason for his being retired to other assignments. Such simple administrative promotion may also apply to P'eng Chen's successor, and Teng T'o's (on the Peking Party Committee), who had been successful officials in comparable positions in nearby Tientsin for some years, with Peking simply the logical next higher place to go.¹⁶

There may be indeed some policy differences among the second level, and even top level, leaders in the inner councils from time to time (witness Ch'en Yün's eclipse at the time of the "leap"), but the recent personnel changes do not appear to be anything out of the ordinary in governmental affairs (and even the economist, Ch'en Yün, has gradually started to reemerge, with his seat on the presidium of the N.P.C. in late 1964 and his listing as vice-premier, next only to Lin Piao, since early 1965).

What else can we deduce about the "cultural revolution"? First, we must realize that "class struggle," together with its language and mannerisms, is a standard method in the Communist ideology for a program of "uninterrupted revolution." This is serious business to them, not just an argument or slogan. In trying to reshape the Chinese society according to the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist blueprint, the Communists have all along been doing what they said they would,

although perhaps revealing only a part at a time to the public. They cannot, from their point of view, succeed by achieving stability as such, or attain prosperity without removing "class exploitation" through "struggle" and thereby "releasing the productive forces" from the potential and actual producers. Hence, they can only hope to succeed by generating continuous dynamism or by riding on wave after wave of directed activities, "with fanfare." This "cultural revolution," therefore, is but one of these waves.

Secondly, in this same process there are, again according to Communist theory, both "quantitative" and "qualitative" changes to be effected. In view of what has gone before—land reform, 3-anti and 5-anti campaigns,* suppression of counterrevolutionaries, agricultural collectivization, socialist construction (the first and second five-year plans), the "bloom and contend" movement, people's communes, the "great leap forward," the disasters of 1959–1962, and the recovery since—the recent three movements of "class struggle," "struggle for production" and "scientific experiment," leading finally to the current "cultural revolution," really represent, in the Communist scheme of things, both forward progression and "qualitative" uplift.

Thirdly, the ultimate goal of "struggle," in this light, is therefore its opposite—"unity" for a particular purpose, or, in practical terms, reasserted leadership of and reassured support for the Communist Party. The "struggle" is always conducted *for* and *against* something or somebody at the same time, never leaving the followers in puzzlement as to where to go, nor merely striking a totally

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¹⁶ For other replacements and personnel involved, see "New Victory for Mao Tse-tung's Thought," *PR*, June 10, 1966.

* Editor's note: The 3-anti, or *San Fan*, campaign was an official 1951–1952 movement directed against governmental corruption, while the 5-anti, or *Wu Fan*, campaign was directed against private corruption at the same time.

In his detailed and informative analysis of recent developments in Chinese military affairs, this specialist concludes that, despite the "great strengths" of the Chinese armed forces, conditions at present still "limit Peking's ability to extend its military power far beyond its own frontiers and restrict its offensive capabilities to the countries on China's periphery."

Military Affairs of Communist China

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IN RECENT MONTHS the American public has been involved in an important debate regarding Communist China and the hostile relationships between the Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.) and the United States. In large measure this increased public interest arose from Peking's strong and vitriolic support for the Communist cause in the protracted war in Vietnam. However, increased attention has also been stimulated by Communist China's rapidly developing nuclear weapons program, by reports that the C.P.R. is preparing for war with the United States and by evidence of a political struggle inside China. In all of these developments the Chinese armed forces have been playing important roles.

¹ *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 272.

² For examples see, "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking; . . .," *Peking Review*, No. 18 (April 29, 1966), p. 5; Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!," *Peking Review*, No. 36 (September 3, 1965), pp. 16-17 or in New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) release (Peking, in English), September 2, 1965.

³ See *Survey of China Mainland Press* (S.C.M.P.), American Consulate General (Hong Kong), No. 3406, p. 10.

⁴ *Bulletin of Activities*, No. 1 (January 1, 1961). Trans. in J. Chester Cheng, ed., *The Politics of The Chinese Red Army*, (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1966), p. 21; *The Military Balance, 1965-1966* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), pp. 8 and 10.

⁵ Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, as reported by the *Washington Post*, December 16, 1965, p. A1.

The most striking difference between the armed forces of Communist China and those of the Western democracies is that the Chinese armed services are a party army, as well as a national military establishment. The original "Red Army" was created by the Communist Party; the troops have long served under the principle that "Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party"¹ and it is officially maintained that the armed forces must be the "most loyal tool" of the party.²

The military establishment is a very large, conventionally armed and unified force, collectively known as the People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.). It consists of an army, a navy, an air force and specialized units. The P.L.A. and the Public Security Forces, which are also under the "direct guidance" of the party's military affairs committee,³ are believed to have a total strength of about 2.7 million.⁴ This is the third largest military establishment in the world, almost as large as the total armed forces of the United States or the Soviet Union.

Despite the "bamboo curtain" of Chinese security consciousness, it is possible to provide a general analysis of the size, equipment and capabilities of the P.L.A. that is probably fairly accurate. Most of Communist China's military personnel are concentrated in a massive army of some 2.3 million men,⁵ which

constitutes the largest ground forces in the world. Following ten years of Soviet-supported modernization from 1950 to 1960 the army is now a complex force consisting of the normal arms, service and staff units. Although it is still primarily a vast infantry army, it contains artillery divisions and several armored, airborne, mountain and cavalry divisions.

The withdrawal of Soviet military assistance in mid-1960 forced the Chinese to adopt a program of military self-reliance, and Chinese factories now provide adequate supplies of light and medium infantry and artillery weapons, as well as some trucks and tanks. However, much of the heavy and complex equipment still consists of material provided by the U.S.S.R. prior to 1960.⁶

THE AIR FORCE

The air force is still the world's third largest, but it was the most seriously impaired of the armed services by the withdrawal of Soviet equipment and spare parts. Recent estimates of available aircraft vary from 2,200 to over 2,600. Fighter strength is estimated at from 1,600 to less than 2,000. Most fighters are obsolescent Soviet MIG-15's and

MIG-17's, but there are a smaller number of supersonic MIG-19's and a modest number of high performance MIG-21's. The decreasing bomber fleet consists of a few old TU-4's (copied by the Russians from the World War II U.S. B-29's) and less than 300 obsolescent Soviet IL-28 light jet bombers. The small transport fleet could be somewhat augmented by civil transports.⁷

The navy has always been the weakest of the Communist Chinese armed services and is primarily a coastal defense force. But although the submarine fleet of some 30 boats is reported to lack adequate deep water experience, it does constitute a potential threat of some importance. This is especially true in view of reports that the navy has or is constructing a Soviet-type "G" class submarine equipped with launching tubes capable of firing three nuclear tipped missiles with a range of 300 to 400 miles.⁸

THE MILITIA

The P.L.A. is supported by a massive militia reserve consisting of "basic" and "ordinary" units. Recently, Peking has claimed that the militia numbers 100 million,⁹ but this is exaggerated, as were the official statements during the "great leap" in 1958 that over 200 million were enrolled in the militia. The multitudinous "ordinary" militia units constitute a vast labor corps, whose members have been given only rudimentary military training. But the "basic" units primarily consist of ex-service men from the P.L.A.—political activists and party members. These "hard core" militiamen must now number well into the millions and they could play an important role in any defense of China or as replacements for the P.L.A. in offensive operations.¹⁰

Communist China's growing conventional arms industries are now credited with the capability to construct not only medium tanks and some submarines, but also modern jet fighters.¹¹ The latter probably include some sophisticated MIG-21 type planes. These developments indicate that despite its economic problems, the C.P.R. is placing a high priority on the development of conventional

⁶ See, *The Military Balance, 1965-1966*, pp. 9-10; "China: Dangers of Misunderstanding," *Newsweek*, March 7, 1966, pp. 36-37; Ralph L. Powell, *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 25, 1966, p. 9.

⁷ Richard Fryklund, "China's Dragon Not Terrifying, Joint Chief's Analyses Says," *Evening Star* (Washington, D. C.), March 18, 1966, p. A1; "Chinese Communist Military Strength," *Zenbo* (Tokyo), No. 10 (October 1, 1965), trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, No. 33, 762 (January 17, 1966), pp. 4-5; *Newsweek*, March 7, 1966, p. 38; *The Military Balance, 1965-1966*, p. 10.

⁸ *Evening Star*, (Washington, D. C.), March 18, 1966, p. A6; *Newsweek*, March 7, 1966, p. 38; *The Military Balance, 1965-1966*, p. 9.

⁹ David Oancia, "China Reports 100 Million in Militia Force," *Washington Post*, April 13, 1966, p. A26.

¹⁰ See Ralph L. Powell, "Everyone a Soldier," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1960, pp. 100-111 and, by the same author, "Communist China's Mass Militia," *Current Scene*, Vol. 111, Nos. 7 and 8 (November 15 and December 1, 1964) and "Communist China as a Military Power," *Current History*, September, 1965, p. 138.

¹¹ *Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, before the House Armed Service Committee, on the Defense Program and Budget, March 8, 1966*, p. 18.

weapons systems and has been making significant advances in weapons technology.

The large majority of the Chinese forces are reported to be deployed near China's land and sea frontiers—to face potential enemies or to prevent renewed revolts among the minority peoples of the border regions of the west and south. Despite the Vietnamese war, there have been no confirmed reports of major shifts in this strategic deployment.¹²

The P.L.A. is “an effective fighting force.”¹³ Its senior officers are experienced combat leaders; its junior officers have been trained in a hierarchy of military schools; its enlisted men are tough and intelligent. During the offensive operations against India in 1962, the P.L.A. demonstrated considerable professional competence. The very size of the P.L.A. and the existence of an inexhaustible reserve force tends to frighten China's Asian neighbors.

Yet, despite their great strengths, the armed forces of Communist China have serious weaknesses. They are still conventional forces in a nuclear era. Also, Chinese factories cannot yet build all the heavy and sophisticated weapons necessary for a major conventional war. Internal communications are insufficient. Air defenses are inadequate. Sea and airlift capabilities are limited. Thus, strategic mobility and logistical support are deficient. These conditions “now limit Peking's ability to extend its military power far

beyond its own frontiers and restrict its offensive capabilities to the countries on China's periphery.”¹⁴

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR?

For the United States, the most critical immediate questions concerning Communist China are whether or not it is preparing for war against the United States and under what circumstances Peking might intervene massively in the Vietnam conflict. Peking has already given very strong political and propaganda support to the Communist cause in both North and South Vietnam. It has also provided aid and assistance, including weapons and military supplies. The C.P.R. is further reported to have sent advisors and thousands of service troops to North Vietnam to assist in the repair of bombed-out communication lines and other facilities.¹⁵

The situation in Vietnam is of great importance to Communist China for several reasons. The war involves such basic objectives of the C.P.R. as the reestablishment of traditional Chinese dominance in Indochina and the related desire to force United States power out of Asia. North Vietnam is a member of the “socialist camp” of Communist states that Peking has pledged to help defend. It serves as an important buffer zone on China's southern flank. The war in Vietnam has become an element in the serious Sino-Soviet dispute. Further, it is an important test case of whether or not the Chinese revolution and its doctrine of “people's war” is actually, as Peking claims, an appropriate model for and stimulant to revolutions in the underdeveloped areas of the globe. The C.P.R. also maintains that the struggle is a “shining example” for revolutions throughout the world.¹⁶ Hence, the prestige of the “sanctified” revolutionary doctrine of Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung is involved in the outcome of the war.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Peking's statements regarding the Vietnamese conflict have been belligerent and alarming. A year ago it was stated that the Chinese people and armed forces had made every preparation and stood “ready in battle array.” It is

¹² *Washington Post*, January 30, 1966, p. A16; *U. S. News and World Report*, February 14, 1966, p. 41; *Newsweek*, March 7, 1966, pp. 36–37; *Evening Star*, March 18, 1966, p. A6.

¹³ *Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara*, p. 18.

¹⁴ See this author in *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 25, 1966, p. 9; also *Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara*, p. 18; *Statement of Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith*, U. S. Marine Corps (Retired), on Communist China's Military Posture, “*U. S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China*, Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 272, 276, 278–279, and 280.

¹⁵ See *Washington Post*, December 12, 1965, p. A1; *The New York Times* January 30, 1966, p. E3; *Evening Star*, March 3, 1966, p. A6.

¹⁶ “Peng Chen's Speech at Peking Rally,” *Peking Review*, No. 30, (July 23, 1965), p. 6; N.C.N.A. (Peking, in English), December 20, 1965; See also Lin Piao, *Peking Review*, No. 36, p. 27.

claimed that air power, sea power and atomic weapons are "paper tigers" that do not intimidate the Chinese.¹⁷ On a number of occasions Peking's spokesmen have literally dared the United States to invade China in case of war.¹⁸ Premier Chou En-lai has stated that should war break out there would be "no boundaries" and that, if the United States attacked from the sky, China would "fight back on the ground." He maintained that it would be "wishful thinking" to believe that a land war could be evaded and that no matter how many men the United States sent, they would be "annihilated."¹⁹ All of this has been said despite repeated denials from Washington that the United States has any intention of attacking China.

Peking has repeatedly stated that the C.P.R. will give all possible aid to North Vietnam and the Vietcong. Several times between March and August, 1965, Communist China threatened to send "men" or "volunteers" to Vietnam. Yet in each case the threat was qualified. "Volunteers" would be sent if "wanted," or "needed" or "asked for."²⁰ Since that time, Peking has

usually been even more circumspect regarding promises to intervene overtly.

Nevertheless, during the last two years there have been indications that the Communist leaders have increased their long-term effort to place China on a war footing. The most critical development has been the series of three nuclear weapon tests. But the P.L.A. has been repeatedly told to prepare for war and stress has been placed on building up the mass militia. There are reports that Hainan Island, northeast of Vietnam, has been heavily fortified. Yet major indicators of preparations for a large-scale offensive war or for a massive intervention in Vietnam are not apparent.²¹ There have been no confirmed reports of major troop deployments to South China.

CAUTIOUS ACTIONS

At the present time, the majority of China's preparations for war appear to be essentially defensive, while other moves are obviously more political or propagandistic than military. Actually, there is an air of unreality in Communist China's talk of war and the Chinese Communist leaders do not really appear to be as convinced that the United States will attack them as their strident propaganda would indicate. Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi has remarked that his hair has grown grey while waiting 16 years for the United States to attack. In fact, he has said further that perhaps he would not have the "luck" to see the United States "imperialists" invade China.²² Frequently official statements regarding a possible United States attack are qualified—for example, "if war comes," "should the United States impose war," "if forced into a war."²³

Actually, the constant talk of war appears to be aimed more at arousing Chinese patriotism, at stimulating a will to sacrifice and at maintaining public support for Mao Tse-tung and his policies than it does at effectively preparing for battle. Another obvious objective is to rouse American and world public opinion against a possible United States attack on mainland China. Yet there is also a visible element of genuine fear under-

¹⁷ Lo Jui-ch'ing, "China Stands Ready to Smash U.S. War Schemes," *Peking Review*, No. 32 (August 6, 1965), p. 5; "Chinese People Are Ready in Battle Array," *Peking Review*, No. 39 (September 24, 1965), pp. 6-7; also Ralph L. Powell, "Great Powers and Atomic Bombs are 'Paper Tigers,'" *China Quarterly*, No. 23 (July-September, 1965), pp. 55-63.

¹⁸ For example see Lo Jui-ch'ing, "The People Defeated Japanese Fascism and They Can Certainly Defeat U. S. Imperialism Too," *Peking Review*, No. 36 (September 3, 1965), p. 39; *Liberation Army Daily*, editorial February 14, 1966, or N.C.N.A., (Peking, in Mandarin), same date; *The New York Times*, March 19, 1966, p. 60.

¹⁹ See N.C.N.A. (Peking, in English), May 9, 1966.

²⁰ For example see, N.C.N.A. (Peking, in English), March 25 and June 21, 1966; *China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), March 22, 1965, p. 1; *Peking Review*, No. 33 (August 13, 1965), p. 6.

²¹ See Charles Taylor, "Peking not Aiming at Collision," *Washington Post*, February 27, 1966, p. E1; *Washington Post*, December 12, 1965, p. A1 and January 30, 1966, p. A16; *The New York Times*, March 10, 1966, p. 1.

²² *Peking Review*, No. 41 (October 8, 1965), p. 14.

²³ For examples see, N.C.N.A. (Peking, in Mandarin), September 3, 1965 and February 3, 1966; *Peking Review*, No. 45 (November 5, 1965), p. 18; No. 15 (April 8, 1966), p. 8; No. 20 (May 13, 1966), p. 7; Radio Canton (in Cantonese), January 14, 1966; *The New York Times*, January 27, 1966, p. 1 and May 13, 1966, p. 3.

lying Peking's present display of bravado.

As yet the Chinese Communists have no atomic deterrent against nuclear strikes, but they are well aware of the terrible power of nuclear weapons. It is also believed that their antiaircraft defenses are not capable of stopping long and hard-pressed conventional air attacks by a superpower. Thus, Communist China would have no real defense against United States forces if the latter were to employ their technological advantages. Hence, in a real sense, China's nuclear facilities and modern heavy industries serve as an important hostage in encouraging them not to undertake aggressive operations. In fact, since the Korean War the foreign policy actions of Communist China have been much more cautious than its violent and vitriolic propaganda would indicate. The Chinese leaders have sought to avoid a direct military confrontation with the United States. Despite their important interests in Vietnam, the Chinese Communists have not rashly and overtly intervened, nor are they likely to do so unless their own security and vital national interests are involved. Furthermore, it is doubtful that even the Communist government of North Vietnam desires to have Chinese troops come to its rescue. Historically, the Vietnamese people have had extensive—and not too pleasurable—experience with Chinese armies on their territory.

One must remember that the C.P.R. has less ability to intervene effectively in Vietnam than is often assumed. Owing to technological and industrial limitations, the defensive power of the Chinese armed forces is greater than their offensive capabilities. China could hurl formidable ground and air forces into Vietnam, but limited strategic mobility and problems of logistical support would not permit it to throw unlimited numbers of troops into the conflict. Also, Peking's relations with the Soviet Union, India,

Nationalist China and South Korea are sufficiently hostile so that the C.P.R. is in no position to strip the garrisons along its other borders in order to augment heavily the forces on its Indochina frontier.

In addition, Peking has an ideological and strategic reason for not intervening in the war. According to the Chinese Communists, the insurrection in Vietnam is a legitimate "people's war" which is "the most effective magic weapon to defeat U.S. imperialism and its lackeys." They say further that, despite superior enemy forces, "people's wars," including the Vietcong conflict, will "inevitably be victorious."²⁴ If Communist China were forced to intervene to save the Vietcong, it would certainly cast doubt on Peking's "universal law" that revolutionary forces in Asia, Africa and Latin America can expand and by themselves ultimately defeat stronger enemy troops.²⁵

Related to this view is a more important concept—Communist China's doctrinal rationalization for not overtly intervening to support "people's wars" or insurrections. Peking promises increasing aid and support, including a "spiritual atomic bomb," but does not promise to send troops to support foreign revolutionaries. It maintains that an insurrection can be won only if the rebels adopt a policy of self-reliance. Friendly foreign aid can be valuable, it states, adding that even a socialist (that is, Communist) country cannot actually win a revolution for another people.²⁶

However, Communist China's deep reluctance to become openly involved in the Vietnam conflict and its rationalization for not intervening should not be interpreted to mean that Communist China would not defend its own borders or its own vital interests. It should be remembered that during the Korean War the Chinese Communists intervened in force when United States and United Nations troops approached the Manchurian borders of China. Peking has long demonstrated that it will not intervene to prevent United States bombing of North Vietnam. Yet the example of the Korean War indicates that, if the United States in-

²⁴ "Salute the Great, Heroic South Vietnamese People," *Peking Review*, No. 52 (December 24, 1965), pp. 10-11.

²⁵ Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁶ Lin Piao, *op. cit.*, pp. 19 and 22.

vaded North Vietnam or otherwise demonstrated a determination to destroy that Communist government and approach China's borders, the C.P.R. would almost certainly intervene. Since the American government has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of destroying President Ho Chi Minh's regime in North Vietnam or of attacking China, it appears that under present conditions and policies Communist China and the United States are not on a "collision course."

WARS BY PROXY

Nevertheless, Communist China obviously believes that it serves its national interest to keep the United States deeply involved in a protracted, costly and politically controversial war in Southeast Asia. Hence, Peking is opposed to peace negotiations or a rational settlement of the war in Vietnam. The dominant leaders of Communist China also hope to "overextend" the United States by promoting "people's wars" in other Asian, African and Latin American countries. But, to serve Peking's interests, these conflicts would also have to remain wars by proxy—wars that did not directly involve Communist China in a massive war with the United States. Furthermore, Communist China is discovering that it is not easy to instigate revolutions far beyond its frontiers, especially if they have to be fought at the expense of the nationalistic leadership of the developing nations. For example, the leaders of the newly independent states of Africa have proved to be more sophisticated regarding Peking's proclaimed "rising tide of revolution" than the Chinese Communists had ap-

parently expected. Actually, the C.P.R. is currently making more progress in developing its own military might than it is in promoting insurrections.

NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

The leaders of Communist China continue to place the highest priority on the development of nuclear weapons. This policy not only foreshadows greatly increased Chinese military power, but also constitutes a potential threat to world peace and encourages the further proliferation of atomic weapons. In October, 1964, and May, 1965, Peking carried out its first and second atomic tests. In each case the devices employed were similar; the fissionable material used was uranium 235 and the yield was approximately 20 kilotons. Thus they were similar to the first enriched uranium bomb developed by the United States in 1945.

However, on May 9, 1966, Communist China exploded a powerful device with an estimated yield that was finally rated by the United States Atomic Energy Commission as being "in the lower end of the intermediate range." This bland statement signifies that the blast had a force of somewhere between 200 and 500 kilotons or the equivalent of 200,000 to 500,000 tons of TNT.²⁷ There is disagreement regarding the exact nature of the device,²⁸ but it was not a full-fledged hydrogen weapon, as some Japanese scientists had predicted. Yet Peking was correct in stating that this powerful instrument contained "thermonuclear material."²⁹ The test represented an important step toward the development of hydrogen or fusion weapons for use by the Chinese forces.

Despite its semi-developed economy, Communist China has at great cost constructed an impressive organization and facilities for the development of nuclear weapons systems. The Chinese succeeded in placing a costly, complex gaseous diffusion plant into operation before industrialized France could do so. Chinese facilities are reported also to include research laboratories, a number of reactors capable of producing weapons grade plutonium, chemical separation plants, small re-

²⁷ *Washington Post*, May 21, 1966, p. A12. For earlier estimates which progressively increased the estimated yield from "about 20 kilotons," to over 100 kilotons, to about 130 kilotons, see *The New York Times*, May 10 (p. 1), and May 11 (p. 1), 1966, and the *Washington Post*, May 10 (p. A1), and May 13 (p. A18), 1966.

²⁸ *Christian Science Monitor*, May 11, 1966, p. 5; *Washington Post*, May 13, 1966, p. A18; *The New York Times*, May 14, 1966, p. 3.

²⁹ "China Successfully Conducts Nuclear Explosion Containing Thermo-Nuclear Material," *Peking Review*, No. 20, (May 13, 1966), p. 4 or N.C.N.A. (Peking, International Service in English); May 9, 1966; *The New York Times*, May 14, 1966, p. 3.

search reactors and perhaps an electron accelerator.³⁰

Although China has a severe shortage of highly trained scientists and technicians, it does have a small number of first-rate nuclear and missile scientists, most of whom were trained abroad. In addition, a considerable number of younger scientists and engineers have been trained in the Soviet Union or in Chinese universities.³¹ The Communist regime has both the will and the ability to concentrate scarce materials and human resources in a nuclear weapons development program. Although the Soviet Union provided considerable assistance in the early phases of the atomic program, the Chinese effectively carried on after the withdrawal of Soviet aid and their ability to advance further should not be underestimated.

In conjunction with their nuclear weapons program the Chinese Communist leaders have also been promoting the development of ballistic missiles.³² These two programs should before long provide an increasingly effective nuclear capability, consisting of both warheads and delivery vehicles. By the end of this decade Peking will probably have an arsenal of atomic weapons, including hydrogen bombs. United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara is reported to have testified that, by 1967–1968, Communist China may begin to emplace medium-range missiles capable of endangering her neighbors. By 1975–1980, Peking may make an initial deployment of ICBM's, intercontinental

ballistic missiles that are capable of striking the continental United States.³³ The nuclear potential of Communist China is of grave concern to the world, including China's neighbor, the Soviet Union.

DOMESTIC FACTORS

Communist China has been undergoing a widespread purge and a radical "cultural revolution." The dominant party leaders appear to be sincerely worried that succeeding generations and even many of the present party members will not preserve intact the revolutionary zeal, the sanctified doctrines, the militant global objectives and the willingness to sacrifice that is thought imperative by their aging Communist rulers. Certainly the leaders have reason to worry, for the history of past revolutions lends credence to their fears. However, at the present time, the hard-line dogmatists appear to have won the first round in the struggle for power. They are aware of the trends that threaten their revolution. Hence, they are making every effort to perpetuate their own dogma, promote "appropriate revolutionary successors" who share their views, and crush all comparatively moderate or even pragmatic opposition. In terms of decades they will probably fail, but in terms of years it is only prudent to assume that these skilled practitioners of power politics will succeed and will continue such basic policies as violent opposition to the

(Continued on page 178)

³⁰ See Lewis A. Frank, "Nuclear Weapons Development in China," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January, 1966, pp. 14–15; also Francis P. Hoerber, "The Economy Behind the Bamboo Curtain," *SRI Journal*, March, 1966, p. 36.

³¹ Cheng Chu-yuan, *Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949–1963*, National Science Foundation (NSF 65-14), (Washington, D. C., 1965), especially pp. 56–58, 186–214, 222–240 and 371–572; Leo A. Orleans, *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China*, National Science Foundation (NSF 61-3), (Washington, D. C., 1961), pp. 115–118.

³² Cheng Chu-yuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 239–40; Morton H. Halperin, *China and the Bomb* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 77–78; *Electronics*, Feb. 7, 1966, p. 51.

³³ *The New York Times*, January 26, 1966, p. 10; *Evening Star*, March 18, 1966, p. A6; *Washington Post*, December 16, 1965, p. A1.

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Offering perspective on current Sino-American relations, this specialist notes that "the real heart of the issue is Peking's drive to gain a world status commensurate with China's new strength. This goal," he continues, "may not be incompatible with American foreign policy aims, for such an adjustment might bring China into the status quo power group . . . [and] permit China to take part in a new and more realistic political order, one in which China itself would have a real stake."

The Sino-American Confrontation: Communist Chinese Perspectives

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ANY ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND the current tension between the United States and China must start with the well-known truism that almost everything is more complicated than it seems. In the case of Sino-American relations, Chinese attitudes are shaped by many forces which combine in different ways at different times. Such forces include historical continuities, internal political developments, the general framework of Marxism-Leninism, the so-called "Maoist" outlook, and China's current international position. Thus, while American diplomatic efforts can go a long way in influencing the outcome of certain critical issues, many of the driving forces behind Chinese foreign policy may be beyond Washington's reach.

For 3,000 years, China was the center of East Asian civilization, a self-contained, ethnocentric world of sophisticated philosophy and culture. Its people referred to their em-

pire as *t'ien-hsia*, or "all-under-heaven," and even today the word for China is *Chung-kuo*, or "middle-country." As Professor John K. Fairbank pointed out in a recent article,¹ the same Western expansion that reaped new opportunities for Western prosperity helped to destroy imperial China. Perhaps the most hated symbol of this incursion was the destructive opium trade, in which American merchants openly took part. The fact that the opium transactions were bilateral has been obscured by the current Chinese conviction that the "foreign devils" (*yang-kuei-tzu*) corrupted the untainted souls of the innocent Chinese.² Nor does the list of grievances stop there. To the leaders in Peking, the United States "Open Door Policy" forms part of an unbroken spectrum of "aggression," of which American presence in Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam constitutes only the most recent evidence.

Another important feature of China's past was the tribute system effected with neighboring areas. Under this system, gifts, homage and external suzerainty were granted to the Chinese emperor in return for protection and noninterference in each area's internal affairs. Denying any concept of equality in international relations, the tribute system was the

¹ John K. Fairbank, "Why Peking Casts Us as the Villain," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 22, 1966.

² It is apparent that the Chinese leadership does not wish the memory of these "offenses" to die; see, for example, "How to Understand the US," *Shih Shih Shou-ts'e (Current Affairs Journal)*, Vol. I, No. 2 (November 5, 1950), in *Current Background (CB)* (American Consulate General, Hong Kong), No. 32 (November 29, 1950), p. 3.

mechanism by which barbarous non-Chinese regions were given their place in the all-embracing Chinese scheme of things.³ Moreover, in true ethnocentric style, China did not even send a Western-type ambassador out of China until the 1870's, a time by when the diplomatic corps of other nations had long been in operation. In short, as compared with other important nations of the world, China has had relatively little diplomatic experience based on compromise among equals.

MARXISM-LENINISM AND THE CHINESE WORLD VIEW

Superimposed upon China's traditional heritage is the Marxist-Leninist view of a rigidly bipolar world, composed of socialist and imperialist camps. To Mao Tse-tung, party chairman, no nation can be really neutral in the long run; it must "lean to one side."⁴ It follows that no nation which criticizes China, as Yugoslavia, India and other nations have done, can be truly neutral. Similarly, any nation which claims to oppose colonialism and neocolonialism must align itself with Communist China; in March, 1959, for example, an article in *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*) stated flatly that the policy of peace and neutrality of Afro-Asian countries, starting from an anticolonialist stand, "cannot but assume the characteristic of uniting with the Socialist countries against imperialism."⁵ This view of the inevitability of eventually siding with one camp or the other has been a remarkably constant part of Chinese diplomatic attitudes.

³ See John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu Teng, "On the Ch'ing Tribute System," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 4 (June, 1941), pp. 138-139. Professors Teng and Fairbank also assert that the traditional Chinese theory of state, in short, was that of a universal empire; see Teng and Fairbank, *China's Response to the West* (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 18.

⁴ See Mao Tse-tung, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (New York: International Publishers, 1954-64), Vol. V, p. 415.

⁵ See *Jen Min Jih Pao*, March 18, 1959, translated by the New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.) and quoted in A. M. Halpern, "The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism," *The China Quarterly*, No. 5 (January-March 1961), p. 98.

Looking at the question in short-range terms, however, the Chinese have shown some appreciation of Afro-Asian neutralism for two reasons. In the first place, the Communist Chinese have their own "strategy of denial" aimed at keeping the West out of as much of the world as possible; accordingly, the refusal of a neutral nation to tolerate Western interference is a step in the right direction. In the second place, there is some evidence that the Chinese, in defining the neutral bloc as a peace area, see neutralism as providing a buffer zone contributing to the security of China in the event of a military attack. In short, the long-range ideological rejection of neutralism has not prevented the Chinese from taking practical, short-range advantage of the situation which neutral nations offer them. In Marxist-Leninist terms, the Chinese seem to feel that the alleged neutrality of the liberated ex-colonial areas need not necessarily hinder the transformation of these areas from the so-called "imperialist rear" to the "anti-imperialist front."

Since the Chinese world view focuses overwhelmingly on the struggle against imperialism, the class struggle idea, so basic to Marxism-Leninism, is often pressed into international service. The post-Sputnik period, for example, has witnessed a revival and an intensification of the theme of an international class struggle of East against West—a struggle in which China sees itself as the vanguard of an international exploited class fighting the exploiters.

PHASES OF ANTI-AMERICAN HOSTILITY

Since 1949, Chinese hostility toward the United States has varied in intensity. During the Korean War, anti-American press attacks constantly stressed the threat of an American invasion of China and launched bitter tirades against the United States. Taking General Douglas MacArthur as the spokesman for the government and dismissing President Harry Truman as a "faithful running dog," the Chinese saw the United States as ruled by a small number of large capitalists who actively promoted a massive attack on

China.⁶ Internally, the American "threat" was useful in promoting unity and in partially counteracting the disruptive influence of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950 throughout China.⁷

Toward the end of the Korean War, the so-called "three-anti" and "five-anti" movements, together with agrarian reform, tended to take precedence over anti-American campaigns. At the same time, an overall easing of Chinese foreign policy took place; by 1955, at the time of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations, comments on relations with the United States reached a new height in mildness. Rather than rabid warmongers, United States leaders were then seen as divided between peace and war, with the international situation definitely favoring peace.⁸ Whether this viewpoint was deliberately expounded in order to harmonize with the spirit of cooperation at Bandung or whether it represented a genuine shift in Chinese attitudes is, however, still a question.

In the last months of 1957, China's at-

titude assumed new and rather sudden hostility. Impressed with such Soviet achievements as Sputnik and the ICBM, Peking then confidently announced that the balance of world power was shifting in favor of the socialist camp.⁹ The United States was again diagnosed as "rabid," and fresh courses of "aggression" were predicted.¹⁰

Since 1958, China's formal attitude toward the United States has remained roughly the same. The administration of John F. Kennedy was seen as similar to the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, although Kennedy himself was pronounced to be "even worse" than Eisenhower. In the same way, the Chinese appear to have dismissed Lyndon Johnson as an incurable warmonger whose administration seriously plans to invade the motherland.¹¹

A look at the past seventeen years suggests that vehement anti-American attacks partly serve to maintain a high degree of internal unity and a rather exhausting level of patriotic fervor. To further these ends, the Chinese leadership is apt to use the United States as a "filler" between intensive ideological campaigns. On the whole, it would seem that a certain degree of Sino-American tension is useful or even necessary to Peking.

CURRENT PROSPECTS

In addition to the tactics of domestic politics, there is the very real factor of nationalism. From available evidence, it is apparent that the Chinese do not view nationalism "from the outside," as Leninist manipulators did, but "from the inside," as nationalists themselves.¹² In theory, Marx condemned nationalism as bourgeois, but the Chinese have found it useful to draw a distinction between "progressive nationalism" and "reactionary nationalism" in order to legitimize their support for the former.¹³ To Lenin, who went further than Marx in seeing the usefulness of nationalism in the colonial East as a weapon against Western bourgeois imperialists, national liberation movements were still inherently bourgeois. The Chinese, however, have come up with a new look at

⁶ "How to Understand the US," *Shih Shih Shou-t's'e* (*Current Affairs Journal*), Vol. I, No. 2 (November 5, 1950), in *CB*, No. 32 (November 29, 1950), p. 5.

⁷ In some cases the threat of an American attack was used to justify the acceleration of regional land reform schedules; see, for example, "Land Reform in East China to be Accelerated," *Shanghai News*, December 16, 1950, in *Survey of the China Mainland Press* (*S.C.M.P.*), No. 35 (December 21, 1950), pp. 7-8.

⁸ Chou En-lai, "The Present International Situation, China's Foreign Policy, and the Question of the Liberation of Taiwan," Report to the National People's Congress, June 28, 1956, in *CB*, No. 395 (July 5, 1956), pp. 2-15.

⁹ It was at this time that Mao came forth with the famous slogan about the East wind prevailing over the West wind; see *Jen Min Jih Pao* (*People's Daily*), November 20, 1957, in *S.C.M.P.*, No. 1662, p. 2.

¹⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at Moscow Celebration Meeting," in *CB*, No. 480 (November 13, 1957), pp. 2-3.

¹¹ See, for example, "The War Threat of U.S. Imperialism Must Be Taken Seriously," *Peking Review*, No. 15 (April 8, 1966), pp. 6-8.

¹² These phrases have been used by Benjamin Schwartz in "Sino-Soviet Relations—The Question of Authority," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 349 (September, 1963), p. 39.

¹³ See "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," *Peking Review*, No. 25 (June 21, 1963), p. 10.

nationalism which plays down class content and focuses instead on how the movement affects China as well as Western "imperialism." Chinese discussions of Asia, Africa and Latin America, for example, advocate unity not only with the so-called "patriotic national bourgeoisie" but also even with "certain kings, princes and aristocrats who are patriotic."¹⁴ Once the bourgeoisie in some newly independent country become "retainers of imperialism," however, and once they pursue "anti-communist and counterrevolutionary policies," then the proletarian party must withdraw its support.¹⁵

Abandoning support for the inevitably reactionary bourgeoisie is not a new policy; what is significant is that a nation's attitudes towards the West and towards China figure so prominently in the criteria used by China. India provides a good example of the use of pro- or anti-Chinese orientation as criteria in determining whether nationalism is "progressive" or "reactionary"; Indian attitudes toward their border conflict led to the Chinese statement that of the two types of nationalism, progressive and reactionary, India's belonged to the latter category.¹⁶ Thus, Communist China's attitude toward other governments seems to be roughly proportional to the degree of pro-Chinese feeling and anti-imperialism shown by them. In other words, both the class content and the internal policies of the leadership of other nations are somewhat irrelevant when it comes to China's national priorities. Since Sino-American rivalry occupies such a central position in Chinese foreign policy, it is probable that Peking will continue its efforts to woo the nations of Africa and Asia away from the West.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁶ Observer, "Indian Reactionaries in the Anti-China Chorus," *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily), July 16, 1963, translated in *Peking Review*, No. 29 (July 19, 1963), p. 13.

¹⁷ *Jiefangjun Pao* (Liberation Army Daily) Commentator, "Hold the Enemy in Deepest Hatred," May 30, 1966, in *Peking Review*, No. 23 (June 3, 1966), p. 12.

¹⁸ Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi, "A New and Great Anti-US Revolutionary Storm is Approaching," *Peking Review*, No. 2 (January 7, 1966), p. 5.

As China's main antagonist, the United States government is resented both as a national foe, in a nationalistic sense, and, in a Marxist-Leninist sense, as an international class enemy. Armed with this two-edged sword, Peking makes frequent use of the concept of *bellum justum*, which often finds expression in Chinese pronouncements. There is little doubt that the Chinese view their claim to Taiwan as a just one. Similarly, the American attempt to keep China isolated is viewed as a direct violation of China's legitimate rights in the world community. Starting with this self-righteous attitude, Peking considers that large concessions will only whet American appetites and that forgiveness is out of the question. The title of a recent article in the *Liberation Army Daily*, "Hold the Enemy in Deepest Hatred,"¹⁷ cannot be dismissed as totally insincere.

From the Chinese point of view, there are solid realities underlying China's resentment against the United States. At the head of the list of grievances is the American presence on Taiwan. Nationalist President Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung are united in their conviction that Taiwan is an integral part of China, and it is for this reason that Taiwan has received the most emphasis in Communist Chinese discussions of Sino-American relations. In a recent interview given to a correspondent of *Akahata*, organ of the Japanese Communist Party, Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi reiterated the primary importance of the Taiwan issue as a key to improving relations between China and the United States.¹⁸

An interesting feature of Ch'en Yi's interview was that America's Vietnam policy captured only fourth place in the list of complaints about the United States; violations of China's air space and territorial waters and the establishment of a chain of military bases surrounding China took second and third place, respectively. From discussions of this sort it is clear that China, like every other country, is primarily concerned about itself and only secondly about its allies. While comments on Vietnam, for example, are somewhat stereotyped, the Chinese press paid great

attention to a comment attributed to United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the effect that there were risks of war with China.¹⁹ From patterns like this, one might draw the tentative conclusion that China will declare war only if actually invaded or if she finds her national security severely endangered.

A similar mood seemed to lie beneath Premier Chou En-lai's four-point statement on China's policy toward the United States, delivered in April, 1966. While declaring that China would not take the initiative to start a war, Chou announced that once war broke out, it would have no boundaries.²⁰ In the context of the statement, Chou ostensibly meant that, in the event of war, the United States could not contain the fighting to the sea and the air and that China would fight back on the ground. Moreover, the statement implied that, if the conflict extended to China, the resulting situation would be basically different from the Korean War; denying any sanctuary, the Chinese would respond in those ways and in those areas where they felt relatively strongest, inside or outside of China.

THE NEXT GENERATION IN A NUCLEAR CHINA

Since the average age of the top Chinese elite is approximately sixty-five, new leaders will soon appear. Meanwhile, it is tempting to assume that in 10 or 20 years China will begin to "soften" in the same way that the Soviet Union appears to be doing.

All evidence indicates that Peking's top leaders are seriously worried about maintaining the revolutionary zeal of the next generation. Since China's forthcoming leaders are too young to remember the indignities of the World War I settlement, the unequal treaties, the "Long March," the years in Yenan and the other chapters in the history of the Communist victory, every effort has been made to recreate this history in their minds. In addition, children have been taught anti-American slogans from the moment they could talk; the potential effect of these early influences must be considered.

Even if one accepts the eventuality of a move toward relaxation, it is important to remember that only 17 years have passed since 1949. Following the Russian analogy, China today should be comparable to the Soviet Union of 1934. In other words, those who favor tolerating the present impasse until China changes her general attitude may have to wait a long time.²¹

Nor is the development of a feasible nuclear weapons system likely to change China's basic attitude, at least not in the short run. In strictly ideological terms, Mao has stressed that it is the manpower and morale of men that really determine the final balance of forces; hence, what the Chinese call "the militant will of the world's peoples" must be aroused and kept alive. Regardless of the existence of nuclear weapons, the Chinese leadership regards war as a multifaceted human activity—involving the mobilization of emotional and psychological forces on the popular level rather than mere technical superiority in the sphere of military action. According to Mao, therefore, nuclear weapons alone do not decide the outcome of a war.²² Nevertheless, as China's nuclear strength develops and its reliance on manpower declines, Peking is likely to give less emphasis to the so-called "man-over-weapons" theory. Instead, more emphasis is likely to be placed on nuclear weapons as important guarantors of victory.

On the whole, Communist China has strong motives for continuing to develop full-scale nuclear weaponry. In the first place,

¹⁹ Strongest Protest Against Grave US War Provocation," *Peking Review*, No. 20 (May 13, 1966), p. 5.

²⁰ "Premier Chou's Four-Point Statement on China's Policy Toward the US," April 10, 1966, *Peking Review*, No. 20, (May 13, 1966), p. 5.

²¹ Naturally, present-day leaders refuse to admit the possibility of change unless the United States changes first. One recent editorial stressed that, if necessary, China must maintain its present posture for even 300 years. See "The War Threat of US Imperialism Must be Taken Seriously," *Peking Review*, No. 15 (April 8, 1966), p. 8.

²² On China's attitude toward war, see Mao Tse-tung, "Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," *Selected Works*, Vol. V, p. 100; and Chinese Government Statement, "China Successfully Explodes its First Atom Bomb," *Peking Review*, No. 42 (October 16, 1964), p. iii.

Peking probably desires a more credible deterrent against the threat of an American attack, as well as additional means of backing up her support in local wars. The Chinese leadership undoubtedly sees the bomb as a tool to gain increased influence within the Communist bloc as well as within the whole of Asia. Finally, it is possible that China also hopes that its new power will enhance its claims to leadership of the whole underdeveloped world. These motives have been particularly strong since 1960, when the Chinese realized that the Soviet Union would not necessarily use its weapons on China's behalf. As long as China's present attitude persists, the possession of nuclear weapons will not necessarily bring about changes in foreign policy. It is probable, however, that China will exercise nuclear restraint unless directly attacked.

CONTRADICTIONARY STATEMENTS

On the potential results of a nuclear exchange, China has issued contradictory statements. Many Americans are familiar with the Chinese statement that even if a nuclear war cost China several hundred million people, there would still be several hundred million left. By contrast, an interview given by Chou En-lai to Agence France Presse implies that in the event of a war, China would lose more than other countries would.²³ Overall, it would seem that China would probably try to avoid any risks which might jeopardize her rapidly growing strength.

²³ "Premier Chou En-lai's Interview with French Correspondent," *Peking Review*, No. 7 (February 14, 1964), p. 64.

²⁴ Quoted in "Impasse with U.S. Held Aim of China," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1966.

²⁵ See, for example, "The U.N.—A Market-Place for U.S.-Soviet Political Deals," *Peking Review*, No. 1 (January 1, 1966), pp. 11–16.

²⁶ A feeling of triumph regarding the American dilemma can be seen in the interview with Vice-Premier Ch'en Yi entitled "A New and Great Anti-US Revolutionary Storm is Approaching," *Peking Review*, No. 2 (January 7, 1966), p. 6.

²⁷ This point is supported by Harold C. Hinton, who argues that China's primary motive in intervening in Korea was "almost certainly" to protect the security of Manchuria, China's most highly industrialized region. See Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), pp. 26 and 214.

Communist China's attitude toward membership in the United Nations is also somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership has always spoken of sending legitimate Chinese delegations to the United Nations, not of being admitted as a new member. For Peking, a solution based on seating two Chinas is out of the question, since this step would invalidate Peking's claim to Taiwan once and for all. Acceptance of mainland China as the sole government of China, however, would automatically give legal support to the Communist Chinese argument that the Taiwan issue is a strictly domestic affair. From this point of view, membership in the United Nations may be highly desirable to Peking.

On the other hand, secret Chinese military journals captured in 1961 admit the advantages of the present situation. If China were to join the United Nations, the journal stated, "we cannot have a majority in voting. . . . Actually the struggle will be more violent and we shall lose our present freedom of action."²⁴ This attitude coincides with recent accusations to the effect that the United Nations is merely a tool of the United States and that the Soviet Union willingly ratifies American designs.²⁵ Meanwhile, the Chinese seem to be enjoying the growing criticism of American efforts to block China's admission.²⁶

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

In spite of almost two decades of anti-Americanism, Peking's foreign policy has been basically cautious. The only major military confrontation with the United States took place in Korea, where, it can be argued, China's national security was at stake.²⁷

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As this author evaluates the situation, "The general approach China has taken in its attempt to establish hegemony in South and Southeast Asia can be characterized as cautious." The states of South and Southeast Asia, he notes, are situated in what China would like to establish as "a sphere of influence or buffer region."

China's Asian Policy

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THE GREAT IMPORTANCE of Communist China's foreign policy for the Western world is matched only by the ignorance and stereotypes prevailing with regard to China's political aims, particularly in America. To some extent, this ignorance results from the nature of the Communist regime and is deliberately fostered by the Chinese. To some extent, it results from the "containment" policy of the United States and the lack of any real communication with Communist China. The Chinese, like the Russians before them, have been able to reap considerable advantage from this situation, keeping their opponents off-balance and forcing them to prepare, wastefully, for many different eventualities.

Moreover, the Western world, and especially the United States, tends to move into a state of hypnosis when confronted by secretive totalitarian polities such as the Soviet Union and China. The enormous literature appearing in the United States on every facet of Communist doctrine and behavior can be taken as one indication of the fascination Americans have for such totalitarian states. It also indicates an American acknowledgement, explicit or implicit, that Marxists do indeed have long-range plans, that they have the key to explaining the past and predicting the future and, for all these reasons, that they know exactly what their goals are and how to reach them.

Added to this is the American penchant to search for the motivations and intentions of China's policy in the misty and tortuous patterns of Chinese Communist thought or in the pages of China's cultural history. Such extravagant explanations are rarely considered in the analysis of other nations' foreign policies. No claim has been made, for example, that the creation of United States bases abroad after World War II was a continuation of the Westward Movement, and few would agree that American support for General Ky in South Vietnam or for General Franco in Spain is the direct result of democratic convictions. On the contrary, such measures are usually excused as regrettable but inevitable deviations from American ideals in defense of the national interest. The Chinese Communists are not exempt from these same dictates. They also are part of the nation-state system, not above it. Certainly if the West could rid itself of its debilitating hypnosis and facile assumptions, its position in today's world would be greatly improved.

The freedom of maneuver on the international scene is as limited for the Chinese as it is for every nation of comparable capabilities. The expression of a people's "national character" and "individuality" can take place only within the framework of the existing international system. The most reliable way of evaluating a nation's interna-

tional behavior, and anticipating its future policy, is to assume that it is based on goals, principles and practices resulting from this system.

Seen in this light, China's foreign policy can be presumed to be designed to safeguard the nation's existence. Its first obligation, clearly, is the development of its internal strength—physical and moral. Beyond its national borders, China would like an area—traditionally called a sphere of influence or buffer region—intended to keep hostile, or potentially hostile, nations at a safe distance. For China, the states of South and Southeast Asia are in this secondary sphere. A third arena of importance to China's security lies beyond the immediate neighborhood and, under modern conditions, encompasses the whole world.

THE SECOND SPHERE

The general approach China has taken in its attempt to establish hegemony in South and Southeast Asia can be characterized as cautious. Even its clash with India in 1962 over their joint Himalayan border is an example of this caution. Prior to that skirmish, China had executed border agreements with Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These tended to "pacify" these nations and to ensure very little support for India from its neighbors in any border contest with China.

The dispute was eventually settled by the brief October war. While the immediate objective of this maneuver was to gain control over the Aksai Chin plateau and the road connecting Tibet with Sinkiang, there were other advantages for China more related to overall strategy. For one thing, China was able to demonstrate India's weakness—eliminating a rival for leadership in the region and encouraging the neutralist states to move away from India and toward China. Furthermore, having given evidence of her strength and of her willingness to use it, China could demonstrate her own "peacefulness" by the unilateral cease-fire and dramatic voluntary

withdrawal of forces from the NEFA¹ area.


Such cautious maneuvering is in line with similar Chinese behavior since 1949. In the same category are the hesitant entry of Chinese soldiers into the Korean war; China's restraint with regard to the offshore islands and Formosa; and its failure to follow up on the ultimatum posed to India in the Sikkim area during India's fight with Pakistan in September of 1965. The Chinese leaders appear unwilling to engage in a direct military confrontation with the nations they consider to be their enemies, primarily the United States and possibly the Soviet Union. They seem to prefer to administer defeats in and through third countries. If one agrees with the Chinese delineation of the nation's borders, Peking's claim that there are no Chinese soldiers outside China is correct. Ever since their rise to power, the Chinese Communist leaders have appeared reluctant to trigger any chain of events over which they might lose control. Direct physical expansion into territories Peking does not consider legitimate parts of China has not so far been the pattern of China's policy.

In spite of much bellicose talk, warnings of dire consequences in the event of hypothetical enemy actions, and impressive but carefully limited promises of "fraternal" aid to fellow Communist states, such as North Vietnam, the Chinese have not engaged their manpower. On the contrary, in their propaganda and in their provocative incitements to Vietnam and other states of the region, they emphasize the need for self-reliance and self-help. The peoples of South and Southeast Asia are reminded that success came to the Chinese Communists through their own efforts, and that the same success will befall those who act likewise. To make these appeals and assurances more convincing, the United States is consistently described as a "paper tiger," totally unwilling to risk a major war.

DIVERGENCE AT HOME

Such an interpretation of China's policy is further supported by a struggle which is apparently taking place between the political

¹ The North East Frontier Agency, a territory in India.



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CHINA AND HER NEIGHBORS

and the military leadership in Peking. The political leaders seem to oppose the plans of some important military leaders for the modernization of the armed forces along scientific lines and prefer, instead, the further development and refinement of guerrilla tactics and warfare. There can be many reasons for this position: the lessons learned from the Communist victory in 1949; the success of such tactics elsewhere; the lack of resources to build a modern army; the greater political reliability of a guerrilla, "citizen" army. But whatever the reasons, the military machine envisaged by the political leaders is not the proper instrument for military conquest and territorial expansion involving confrontation with a modern army. Thus, Peking sounds credible when it repeats over and over again in its running debate with Moscow that it does not cherish the prospect of a major international war any more than the Soviet Union and that it has no intention of risking one.

DIVERGENCE ABROAD

Nonetheless, China does seem bent on fomenting revolutionary civil wars or "wars of liberation" in Southeast Asia. And, although it has been unwilling to involve its own manpower, it has been willing to lend other forms of support and to practice brinkmanship.

At this point, China comes into conflict with the United States and the Soviet Union. For the latter nations, the region is of secondary importance as regards physical security, and of primary importance only in relation to a worldwide competition for power. For China, this order is reversed. The elimination of the United States from Asia is for China a matter of security as well as of general power position. For the Soviet Union, the area is of importance to her general power position toward both the United States and China.

These differences in viewpoint explain, at least to some extent, China's preoccupation with Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union's relative aloofness. For the Soviet Union, any war in Southeast Asia is the wrong war in

the wrong place at the wrong time. China is fully aware of the Soviet Union's uneasiness and is following a dual policy designed to make the most of the Soviet dilemma. For example, the Chinese criticize the Soviet Union for its "cooperation" with the "imperialists" and its "betrayal" of the revolutionary cause. The focal point at the moment, of course, is Vietnam, where China challenges Moscow to provide more aid for this "fraternal" cause. They then use the lack of Soviet enthusiasm to prove to the Communist world Moscow's "decadence" and her forfeiture of leadership in the "fraternal" camp. Implied in this argument is, of course, China's successorship.

At the same time, the Chinese are clearly unwilling to permit Moscow any significant role in Vietnam, lest this might enhance the U.S.S.R.'s political influence. Soviet advisers have been obliged to fly across China to Vietnam only at night. Soviet aid to Hanoi has been held up in China until Moscow agreed that it would not be accompanied nor followed by Soviet manpower. And Peking's persistent encouragement of Hanoi's belligerency is diametrically opposed to Moscow's general line of peaceful conversion to communism.

China's hostility to the Soviet Union in this area has not yet assumed the proportions that characterize its hostility toward the United States. Nevertheless, there is conflict and it is finding expression more in the relations between the Communist states and third powers than in direct contacts with the Soviet Union. This divergence broke into the open during the Indian-Chinese fighting in the Himalayas when, eventually, the Soviet Union favored India's position. It was evident in the Indian-Pakistani war during 1965 when the Soviet Union undermined China's support of Pakistan by officiating over the Tashkent Conference and the subsequent cease-fire.

It can be seen in less dramatic fashion in minor incidents, for instance, in late 1965, in the cancellation of Moscow's invitation to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia as an obvious reprimand for his friendship with China, or

in Moscow's suggestions that Afghanistan should continue to rely more on Soviet than on Chinese help.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

China's actions in Asia are based on its assumption that there is strong nationalist and revolutionary ferment which it can exploit and which it must prevent others from exploiting. With the United States, this is relatively easy since contemporary American policy has shown a great lack of understanding of the motivations of the countries of South and Southeast Asia or a determination to ignore them. Its task is more difficult with regard to the Soviet Union, since Moscow's leaders tend to share the Chinese assumptions and have had long practice in using them to good advantage. The Chinese represent the United States as an imperialist determined to crush freedom movements and to dominate peoples through support of reactionary puppet leaders. The Soviet Union is represented as a turncoat which has abandoned all revolutionary fervor. This, by the process of elimination, leaves China as the only true champion of revolutionary causes.

The danger to China in this maneuvering is the possibility that the small states of the region might engineer a three-cornered balance of power. The strong nationalism in the region could—with the help of the other two major powers—lead to a rejection of any form of Chinese overlordship. Another possibility is that should any one state turn to communism, the interference of the Soviet Union might lead to Titoism. Either course of events would not comfort China. To prevent such an eventuality, the Chinese attempt to supplement their propagandistic appeals and demonstrations of might with diplomacy on an official level.

But China's diplomacy has not shown much imagination. Dignitaries in Peking and the states of the region have exchanged countless visits; but, beyond meaningless communiques, few concrete results have appeared. Most leaders of the South and Southeast Asian states show a remarkable resilience in revert-

ing to their basically independent positions. Aid is being supplied to select countries for select—and often strategically useful—purposes. Trade agreements are concluded which appear to be mutually profitable and politically harmless. Cultural missions are exchanged.

At the same time, it is worth noting that Chinese diplomacy labors under a severe disadvantage of its own making. While Communist doctrine as expounded by Peking admits the possibility and even advisability of cooperating with certain "bourgeois" statesmen, it points out the purely temporary and expedient nature of such cooperation. It also asserts that true independence and modern development cannot come to a country by any means other than revolutionary wars of liberation. Stripped of its ideological disguise, China is advising her neighbors that in her dealings with them she is considering all relations as purely temporary and makeshift until they have established regimes subservient, or at least sympathetic, to China. The difference then between the intentions of China and those of many other nations in comparable situations in Asia is China's greater frankness about her political aims. As a result, if Chinese diplomacy does succeed in the region, it is most likely to be due to fear and the reality—openly pointed out by such leaders as Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and Ne Win of Burma—of her contiguity.

THE BALANCE SHEET

But in fact, a balance sheet of China's diplomacy during the most recent period does not show many profits. It is true that, in Vietnam, the United States has been involved to an enormous degree with no comparable investment by the Chinese. In the United Nations, the Communist government has come close to being admitted. Since Peking considers the United States her worst enemy, she may feel that great gains have been made. But from any viewpoint this exhausts the items on the credit side.

There are important items on the debit side. The events in Indonesia during 1965 greatly reduced China's influence there. In

addition, the change of regimes and policies in Indonesia strengthened Malaysia's position so that it felt safe in diminishing China's economic influence further by closing the local office of the Bank of China. In 1965, the suspension of the Second Bandung Conference of the Asian-African states, though claimed by China as a success, was in fact a blow to China's prestige and political standing, since the collapse was due to the refusal of the majority of the participants to support China's policy against the Soviet Union and Malaysia. At the Committee and Plenary Meetings of the World Peace Council in Stockholm and Helsinki in 1965, China's proposals for a strong stand against the "imperialists" and against Indian "aggression" in Pakistan were consistently and overwhelmingly outvoted. The Tashkent Conference,² in turn, underlined China's inability to be of real help to Pakistan and—of much greater importance—brought the successful return of the Soviet Union to the affairs of South Asia. Even in Vietnam, China suffered setbacks. She was criticized, however subtly, for delaying the arrival of Soviet aid. And in March, 1966, the North Vietnamese government not only sent a delegation to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—boycotted by Peking—but praised the Soviet government for its "high international proletarianism."

In the light of this poor balance sheet, China might compensate by increased promotion of insurgency and revolution in Asia. In fact, there have been reports of increased activity by Communist agents in several places—for instance, in the Philippines, Laos, Thailand, and northern Burma. It could be, however, that the same factors causing China's diplomatic weakness could lead to a failure of any attempts to provoke insurgency.

The peoples of South and Southeast Asia are clearly getting tired of violence and are increasingly eager to improve their material welfare. They are in no mood for revolu-

tionary warfare and any such appeals meet with cool response. They do not see the world—as Vice-Premier and Minister of National Defense Lin Piao in his fundamental statement of September, 1965, claims to see it—as one great battlefield between imperialism and communism.³ They see themselves, and other nations, as individual units with their own characteristics and divergent interests, even if included in these are mutually exclusive, competing interests.

In the planning of economic improvements, the appeals of Communist or, indeed, of any doctrine no longer are as effective as they used to be. The leaders of the states of South and Southeast Asia have had more than a decade of practical experience with economic development. They have become sophisticated enough to know that each problem needs its own solution—a solution which must be adapted to the prevailing special circumstances. They are inclined to be pragmatic rather than doctrinaire in these matters. Finally, in their constructive rather than destructive mood and in recognition of China's military cautiousness, the governments of South and Southeast Asia feel emboldened to resist outside pressures and assert their countries' independence. How long and how successfully they can pursue such policy will, in the long run, depend to a large extent upon the encouragement they receive from the more powerful nations—nations which identify their own interests with the independence and economic development of the states of South and Southeast Asia.

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² Held under Soviet auspices in 1965 to resolve the Indian-Pakistani dispute.

³ For excerpts of Lin Piao's statement on "the People's War," see page 172 of this issue.

After analyzing the economic factors at work on mainland China today, this long-time China student makes the point that "noneconomic factors may well determine the economic choice." Together, he continues, "they point to a higher rate of capital investment, a gradual shift in favor of industry, lesser reliance on material incentive, greater party control over economic and scientific policy, and . . . an independent and viable nuclear capability"—with or without a third five-year plan.

The Third Five-Year Plan: An Economic Dilemma

By YUAN-LI WU

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IN HIS DECEMBER, 1964, report to the National People's Congress, Chou En-lai stated that the third five-year plan was scheduled to begin in 1966 and that 1965 was to be spent in further strengthening the economy preparatory to its advance under the new plan. (It is well to recall that the third five-year plan should have begun in 1963, or even in 1961, inasmuch as the second five-year plan, officially scheduled to end in 1962, reportedly was about to attain most of its original objectives as early as 1960.) However, as of the summer of 1966, no official data have appeared on the contents of the plan. The delayed release of such information has prompted an astute observer in Hong Kong to remark: "The plan for the five years of course is not ready. It is not even certain that the main objectives have been fixed."¹

Neither the secrecy nor even the absence of a completely formulated plan should, however, surprise us. Official information on the first five-year plan (1953-1957) was not made public until it had run nearly half of its

course. Moreover, in retrospect, there is reason to believe that the operational plans were at first on an annual basis only and that the annual plans were later incorporated into the five-year plan. The implied tentativeness and flexibility were justified by uncertainties and institutional changes then being contemplated by the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) By the same token, we should expect hesitation today when major uncertainties again prevail.

If and when a definite five-year plan is published, its announcement would signal the fact that the C.C.P. has reached some basic decisions and that a certain minimal amount of information on trends and capabilities required for intelligent planning must have become available. It is not difficult to visualize what some of these issues are.

Since the failure of the "Great Leap," especially since 1963, the effort to slow down population growth in China has been intensified. A Hong Kong report indicates that large families are now penalized by the authorities through withholding of food and clothing allowances normally granted at child-birth after the third child.² The array of measures employed to curb the birth rate in-

¹ *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), No. 596 (January 21, 1966), p. 1.

² *The New York Times*, April 27, 1966, p. 1.

clude late marriage (30 and 25 being advocated as the minimum marriage ages for men and women respectively), legalized abortion, sterilization (recommended for persons with more than two children), and the practice of contraception (generally recommended, but especially for persons already having two children.)³ Current issues of *Chinese Women* are replete with questions from readers on family planning, as well as statements by, and exhortations to, woman cadres in the communes regarding the cadres' leadership role in what has become a major campaign. Indications are that the campaign has already scored a modicum of success in lowering the very high birth rate in cities such as Shanghai.⁴ But the more far-reaching development is the emphasis on curbing rural birth rates, which distinguishes the current campaign from abortive efforts in earlier years.

Among the various reasons offered for the drive, a principal argument is that, unless population growth can be brought under control, any improvement in the standard of living will be retarded in spite of the growth of production.

Thus, the decision on just how fast to expand the economy and to industrialize must be predicated on some intelligent assessment of demographic factors. It is entirely possible that the Chinese planners are still plagued by lack of reliable information themselves.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION

A second matter which must cause the planners to pause is the allocation of investment—in particular, the relative emphasis that should be given to agriculture, industry, and military expansion respectively. There are certain weapons development goals which appear to enjoy top priority. Even leaving the military question aside, the relative weight that should be assigned to agricultural versus nonagricultural development, that is, the de-

sirability of modifying the "agriculture first" policy of the last few years, must continue to worry the planners. As long as grain import and the resultant large foreign exchange expenditure are continued, some sacrifice of import of industrial materials and equipment, as well as imports for weapons development, seems to be unavoidable.

There are a number of estimates of 1965 grain production. The volume is believed to be 185 million tons⁵ or a little higher, not substantially different from the 1957 crop, notwithstanding an estimated 15 per cent increase in population. At this rate, imports would have to be continued for the time being. Even allowing for better performance in the immediate future, the past record in agriculture cannot give Chinese planners a "green light" to shift to a greater emphasis on industrial development any time soon, or at least not without qualms.

THE IMPONDERABLES

If only economic considerations had to be weighed, economic planners in China would probably prefer a pragmatic and flexible approach. However, ideological and doctrinal attitudes often play a decisive role and may do so again in determining (1) the planned rate of growth in the third five-year plan, (2) the allocation of investment between industry and agriculture and between the civilian economy and military expenditure, including weapons development, and (3) the relative emphasis to be given appeals to ideology and conformity with party dogma, versus appeals to individual initiative, as the motive force propelling the drive toward greater economic growth.

There are several straws in the wind, which one can point to without a detailed political analysis. First, since about 1963, a "socialist education movement" has striven to curb the spontaneous development of any "bourgeois tendencies" by the Chinese farmer, through production on private plots and other related operations. Second, the "cultural revolution" begun in 1966 is apparently aimed at achieving stricter adherence among Communist intellectuals to a unified view of the world

³ *Ibid.* See also *Chung-kuo Fu-nü (Chinese Women)* (Peking), No. 1 (January, 1966), p. 24.

⁴ See *China Report* (Bombay), Vol. 2, No. 1 (December, 1965-January, 1966), p. 5.

⁵ Cf. *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Vol. III, No. 32 (December 1, 1965), p. 2.

and of the "laws of development." Third, there seems to be a continued ideological commitment to speedy industrialization; even another try at a "great leap" may yet be made.⁶ Lastly, both the Communist Party and the military high command seem to have committed themselves to a substantial expansion of the country's nuclear arsenal.

In combination, these noneconomic factors may well determine the economic choice. They point to a higher rate of capital investment, a gradual shift in favor of industry, lesser reliance on material incentive, greater party control over economic and scientific policy, and a simultaneous push toward the development of an independent and viable nuclear capability, possibly in the next decade.

RECENT INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

It is still too early to conclude that this so-called "Maoist" strategy will surely characterize the third five-year plan. The current proletarian "cultural revolution" directed by Mao (or undertaken in his name) is in itself a symptom of the party leadership's lack of confidence that its present policy will be able to survive Mao. However, what will happen if such a strategy is adopted?

To a large extent, the correct answer to this question will depend upon the state of the

economy when the decision is reached, as well as the manner in which any new "leap forward" is attempted. We have already noted the effect of the lagging grain sector. A review of certain features of recent industrial and technological development is also needed.

There were some noteworthy accomplishments during 1965. The effort to increase chemical fertilizer production during recent years under the "agriculture first" policy led to a sharp expansion of the industry. The total capacity of domestic production may have reached a high of 7.3 million metric tons at the end of the year, divided roughly between nitrogenous and phosphorous fertilizers in a ratio of 4 to 3.⁷ This compares with 4 million tons in 1964.⁸ The emergence of a significant production of phosphorous fertilizers constituted a departure for mainland China and should be especially noted. The production capacity of pumping equipment probably exceeded 2.5 million h.p. a year in 1965; tractor production in the same year was expected to reach 20,000 units, comparable to the planned, but not realized, figure for 1960.

While the expansion of farm equipment and fertilizer production was to be expected because of the emphasis on agriculture, other advances were no less significant. Both crude oil and electric power production reached their historical high, at over 10 million tons and more than 55 billion kilowatt-hours, in 1965.⁹ Even in the case of coal, 310 million tons of which were mined in 1965, the total output in terms of thermal value may have surpassed the previous peak before the economic crisis, allowing for the deterioration of quality during 1958–1960¹⁰ and the presumably better quality in 1965. The expansion of energy output especially was a reflection of general industrial growth and should be treated as a sign of the further consolidation of economic recovery that 1965 was expected to bring.

One feature of the recovery process since 1961–1962 has been its division into stages or phases. In general, production in such heavy industries as iron and steel, coal, electric power, power equipment, and machine tools

⁶ See Robert Keatley's report in *The Wall Street Journal* (Pacific Coast Edition), July 15, 1966.

⁷ Hsiao Chi-jung, "Ta-lu Kung-yeh Hui-fu Ch'eng-tu chi Chin-nien Sheng-ch'an Kai-k'uang" (Industrial Recovery and Production on the Mainland in Recent Years) in *Ta-lu Fei-ch'ing Chi-pao* (Mainland China Quarterly) (Taipei), January, 1966. For pumping equipment see also *Peking Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (January, 1964) and the *People's Daily*, December 31, 1964.

⁸ See the author's article in the September, 1965, issue of this journal, p. 167.

⁹ The potential production of crude oil in 1965 has been estimated at as high as 18 million tons according to the *Chu-kyo Tsei Geppo* (Communist China Information Monthly) (Tokyo), No. 11 (June 18, 1965), pp. 27–28.

¹⁰ The peak production of 1960 totaled 425 million tons, of which 344 million came from modern mines. But in terms of "standard coal," a heat unit of 7,000 kilocalories per kilogram, one hundred tons of raw coal in 1960 were equivalent to only 48.1 tons of standard coal in contrast to about 70 tons during the early 1950's. See Yuan-li Wu, *Economic Development and the Use of Energy Resources in Communist China* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 39, 109, and 341.

reached its lowest point in 1961 and began to recover thereafter. On the other hand, cotton textiles, sugar and lumber production passed their respective troughs in 1962. This particular sequence reflected both the dependence of consumer goods industries on the recovery of agricultural production and the strong emphasis given to readjustment in the heavy industries following their disruption brought about by the Soviet withdrawal of specialists and stoppage of essential equipment. The effort to "fill the gaps" opened by Soviet withdrawal, which doubtless compounded Communist China's own planning errors, was apparently fairly successful. *The China News Analysis* reported in March, 1966, that, despite the absence of Soviet assistance, 113 industrial plants, many of which had been planned initially with Soviet aid, had been completed under the supervision of Chinese engineers.

In general, industrial recovery and adjustment were first concentrated in the electric equipment, farm machine, chemical fertilizer and petroleum industries. A second phase of adjustment appeared to be focused on iron and steel, coal mining and individual branches of machine-making. In very broad terms, the first phase of adjustment took place from the latter part of 1961 through the first half of 1964 while the second phase began in the second half of 1964 through 1965. Since one of the causes of the previous economic crisis was severe sectoral imbalance, the recovery program noted above was directed at a more balanced growth in the future. Increased production of coal and ores has, for instance, served to expand the raw material base. While there may still be a serious imbalance between industry and agriculture, the gaps may have been substantially narrowed within the industrial sector.

¹¹ See Yuan-li Wu, *The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction* (New York: Praeger, 1965), and a forthcoming study on Chinese research and development by Robert B. Sheeks and the present author.

¹² On the expansion of the steel industry and other improvements, see footnote 7, as well as K. P. Wang, "The Mineral Industry of Mainland China," in *Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook*, 1963 and 1964, U.S. Dept. of the Interior.

As a part of the effort to achieve "self-reliance" in technology, a very large number of institutes of industrial design have been set up during the last few years under the many industry ministries. The principal function of these institutes is to copy and adapt to Chinese conditions model plants and individual equipment obtained from abroad, including the designing of spare parts required for maintenance of equipment imported in past times. If the effort were successful, Communist China would become gradually independent of foreign equipment import as a component of capital goods used in investment projects, which would increase the "transferability" of resources in production from one purpose to another. Clearly, if there were perfect transferability of resources, the rate of investment, and, in consequence, of economic growth in general would become a function solely of the Communist government's ability to regulate personal and government consumption (including defense), while worries about technical rigidities and sectoral shortages as a cause of waste of resources and enforced idleness would be greatly diminished. As the author has tried to show, this is needed to combat fluctuations of the total output and to achieve steady growth.¹¹

One should assess in the same light some of the successes in the increase in product variety and in technical improvements. In the steel industry, there were certain major additions to equipment at Wu-han and Pao-t'ou, both during the crisis years of 1960-1962 and in 1963-1964, as well as Ma-an-shan, Anshan, Chungking, K'un-ming, Shih-ching-shan, and T'ai-yüan. During 1965, further increases in equipment were reported at Ma-an-shan, Anshan, Pao-t'ou, Huhehot, and Hantán. These expansions were accompanied by various technical changes, including the injection of oxygen and fuel gas into blast furnaces and the use of alumina-magnesia bricks for furnace lining. In terms of product variety, 282 new types of steel were reportedly introduced during the first half of 1965, which may be compared with 40 new types in 1961, 119 in 1962, more than 100 in 1963, and 400 in 1964.¹²

There are still other signs of approaching industrial "maturity" including, for instance, wider use of scrap iron for steel making, a growing concern with problems of industrial waste, and a general search for methods to exploit by-products. These efforts signify not only an awareness of the need to increase the rate of growth, but also some degree of success in actually increasing output.

PRESENT OBSTACLES

The preceding account should not be construed to mean that the industrial sector is now ready to support a new "great leap." Many serious obstacles remain. A major one is the long lead time required between the trial manufacture of a commodity and its regular production. Of the new steel products trial-manufactured in 1961-1965, only a third is said to have reached regular production. The manufacture of a prototype of a 72,000-kw water turbine was first reported by the Harbin Electric Equipment Plant at the end of 1958. But its actual manufacture was not mentioned until the end of 1963. The lapse of 3 to 7 years between the appearance of the first prototype and the manufacture of any new equipment appears to be fairly common.¹³ Engineers in the many institutes of industrial design have also complained about the multiple models of machines which they have to copy and the difficulties presented to maintenance and repair by the vast variety of spare parts required by these divergent designs. Some of the machines employed for duplication in Communist China may become obsolete, if they are not already, before a successful copy can be produced. Obviously, this would have an adverse effect on Chinese productivity and reduce the future competitive ability of Communist China in the world market. To be effective, the engineers and scientists may have to be given a freer rein; however, the current drive toward greater conformity does not point to such a development.

Another obstacle to the rapid development of Chinese scientific and technological self-

sufficiency appears to be the over specialization of Communist China's new engineers and technicians. In the interest of speed many of the new graduates of regular and special training classes have such narrow specializations and limited experience that they cannot be freely transferred from one function or field to another without retraining; especially lacking are the ranks of experienced persons who can be project leaders and research managers. This fact plus the long lead time needed to translate prototypes into machines on the assembly line means that the specific shortages from which the Chinese economy suffered in 1960-1961 cannot be readily removed, possibly not even within the duration of the third five-year plan.

From the Chinese point of view, it seems that the borrowing of knowledge from abroad will have to be expanded and the purchases of foreign equipment increased. It is possible that grain imports could be continued while additional exports are developed to provide for the foreign exchange expenditure. A notable expansion of cotton spinning was accomplished during 1965, including a 110,000 spindle mill at Wu-han and one large mill in Szechwan. A Taiwan report puts the planned increase in cotton spinning during the third five-year plan at three to four million spindles.¹⁴ Increases in cotton planting have also been reported. The development of textile and related exports would indeed be a natural step in a renewed export drive during the next few years.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND MILITARY CAPABILITY

Finally, we turn to the question whether military expansion would constitute an unbearable burden to the Chinese economy. Alternatively, we may ask: What are the nature and magnitude of Communist China's military capability given the range of her probable economic development?

In order to answer these vital questions, we have to think in terms of the "transferability" of resources between military and civilian use and the nature of resource requirements corresponding to different mili-

¹³ See footnote 7 above.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

tary programs. If resources, both human and material, are transferable between the civilian and the military sectors in the sense that they are equally or almost equally productive and useful in either sector, then an expansion of the military sector would result in a decrease in the output of the civilian sector if there is full employment of resources. Given intersectoral transferability, a decrease in the amount of resources at the disposal of the civilian sector due to military expansion could result in a much greater decrease in total civilian output if there is rigidity or imperfect transferability of resources within the civilian sector. For instance, a machine tool transferred from civilian to military use may lead to a large drop in investment if it is an indispensable component of a large installation. A particular category of the same nature consists of imported equipment or raw materials which must be paid for in foreign exchange, a perfectly transferable asset between the civilian and military sectors. In short, military expansion entails a cost to the civilian economy if there is intersectoral transferability, and the cost is larger the more there is. If no transferability exists between the two sectors, the magnitude of military expansion would then be subject solely to the constraint imposed by the availability of specialized resources which the military sector requires.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the above theoretical propositions, we may tentatively suggest the following: First, a sizable military effort of the Korean War type using conventional weapons could mean an excessive burden to the civilian economy of Communist China because of its large demand on the domestic machine industry and imports which could sharply curtail the supply of machines for domestic investment. Second, further development of nuclear weapons, on the other hand, may not entail too great a contraction of the civilian sector and its growth. This is postulated on the assumption that while specialist personnel required by nuclear weapons development may be useful to the civilian sector, the highly

specialized and narrowly trained technicians and engineers now employed in the civilian sector may not be easily transferable to weapons development. Moreover, the imported equipment required by the nuclear weapons industry may not constitute too large a burden on China's balance-of-payments position in view of the fact that the foreign exchange expenditure for such equipment was apparently absorbed without too much difficulty even during the crisis years. Should grain production expand on schedule, an annual sum of more than \$350 million now needed for grain import could be made available for the required imports of the military program. This amount would represent nearly 20 per cent of present total imports. Third, low-level military activity of the type described by the Communists as "wars of national liberation" can probably be sustained by Communist China on a long-term basis.

All these conclusions must be extremely tentative. They must be supplemented by a more careful analysis of the costs and input requirements of different weapons systems. Furthermore, these preliminary observations are based on the assumption that the Chinese mainland and its economy will not be subjected to the effects of hostile military activities. If this assumption holds, unless the economy undergoes a sharp recession as it did in the beginning of the 1960's, Communist China's military capability will continue to pose a threat to peace—probably an increasing one—in the next few years even if the prospects of her internal economic growth are not necessarily promising.

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Looking at the economic side of the Taiwanese coin, this observer finds that "A study of the 1965 statistics indicates that a high rate of growth is continuing [on Taiwan] even with the suspension of United States aid. The GNP is up 7.42 per cent over 1964 and the per capita income has risen 4.32 per cent. . . . By comparison with mainland statistics, which are difficult to validate, some economists put the per capita income on Taiwan at about three times that of mainland China."

Taiwan: "The Other China"

By MARK A. PLUMMER

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DURING THE PAST DECADE the political viability and rapid economic growth of Nationalist China has been largely obscured in the shadow of Communist China's monumental political consolidation of the mainland. However, the recent economic, political, and diplomatic setbacks of the Communist regime have focused attention on the relative success of Taiwan,* the "other China." While the Nationalists were completing a highly successful land reform program on Taiwan, the Communists witnessed the ignominious failure of their "great leap forward." Soviet aid to the People's Republic ended prematurely as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split while United States economic aid to the Republic of China ended only because of the success of the program. The recent leadership struggle on the mainland is in contrast to the stability of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Though the magnitude of its task was small by comparison, the Nationalist government has been remarkably successful in ruling Taiwan as a "model province."

Taiwan is a tobacco leaf shaped island lo-

cated 90 miles off the southeast coast of the China mainland. Its land area is approximately the same as Massachusetts and Connecticut combined. The island was sparsely settled before the seventeenth century when a great migration across the Taiwan straits began. The vast majority of the present day Taiwanese are descendants of these earlier "mainlanders." Japan was ceded the island as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and did much to modernize the economy of Taiwan, while maintaining firm control.

At the end of World War II, the Chinese government received the surrender of the Japanese forces on Taiwan. Although the Taiwanese welcomed their deliverance from the Japanese, they soon became disillusioned with their new rulers who treated the island as conquered territory. The Nationalist government, involved in a civil war with the Communists, did nothing to relieve this misrule until it was forced to evacuate the mainland and move the seat of government to Taipei in 1949. The loss of the mainland apparently made the Nationalists more aware of the importance of popular support and political and economic reforms were haltingly begun. Then, with the coming of the Korean War, the United States offered military and economic assistance and the economic situation began to improve.¹

* Ed. note: Taiwan and Formosa are often used interchangeably.

¹ Joseph W. Ballantine, *Formosa, A Problem for United States Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1952) contains the best brief history of pre-1952 Taiwan.

Stimulated by United States aid, the economic growth of Taiwan over the last 15 years has been remarkable. The average annual growth in the gross national product (GNP) has been more than eight per cent while the per capita annual income has increased more than four per cent in spite of a very high population growth rate. This GNP growth rate is twice that of the United States and the highest in Asia, except for Japan. The announcement of the end of United States dollar grants on June 30, 1965, was the occasion for reviewing the course of American aid and for an examination of the previously unheralded economic "miracle." Since 1950, the United States has poured a total of almost \$1.5 billion in economic aid and \$2 billion in military assistance into Taiwan. According to the Agency for International Development (AID) officials, the Republic of China used the aid wisely and well; so well that further grants seemed unnecessary.² And President Lyndon Johnson, in his foreign aid message to Congress of February, 1965, singled out Taiwan as evidence that aid monies can be used to promote self-sufficiency among the underdeveloped countries of the world.

HIGH GROWTH RATE

A study of the 1965 statistics indicates that a high rate of growth is continuing even with the suspension of United States aid. The GNP is up 7.42 per cent over 1964 and the per capita income has risen 4.32 per cent. To the average Taiwanese this means, among other things, an adequate diet of more than 2,600 calories each day, a consumption rate second only to Japan in Asia, and an increased life expectancy which has now risen to age 67. By comparison with mainland statistics, which are difficult to validate, some economists put the per capita income on Taiwan at about three times that of mainland China.

² "U. S. AID Program and China's Economic Progress," U.S.I.S. Taipei Press Release, January 26, 1966.

³ *The China Yearbook, 1965-66* (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1966) is a generally reliable source of Taiwan economic and political statistics.

United States aid is apparently being supplanted by an increasing amount of investment from overseas Chinese and from regional and world banking organizations. The United States also acts as a guarantor for some private loans. It should also be noted that there is still some United States aid money in the "pipeline"—that is, money committed but not yet expended.

Industrial production has been growing at the rate of about 15 per cent per year. Most of this growth has been in the private sector of the economy. Ten years ago more than 60 per cent of Taiwan's industrial production came from public enterprises compared to only about 30 per cent in 1965. Industrial and farm products account for an ever-increasing volume of foreign trade. The year 1965 was Taiwan's first billion dollar trade year; this tripled the 1952 total.

Agricultural growth, although less impressive in terms of percentage growth (8 per cent in 1965), is remarkable considering the geography of Taiwan. Only about 24 per cent of the island is arable and the population growth rate makes great demands upon the agriculture. Taiwan is second only to Holland in population density and yet production has risen sufficiently not only to meet domestic demand but also to permit continued export of rice and other foodstuffs.³

LAND REFORM

The Republic of China's land reform program has been responsible for much of this increased productivity. Working through a Sino-American agency known as the Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction (J.C.-R.R.), the government implemented a land reform program that serves as a model for the developing nations. The "land-to-the tillers" program began in 1953 when the government purchased the land of the large landowners and distributed it to the peasants who had actually been working the land. The former owners were paid annual installments for ten years based upon the production and the current price of rice. The landlords were also paid in part in government corporation stocks, many of which were

of little value at the time but are now highly valued. Thus, many landlords became reluctant industrial entrepreneurs. In 1963, the payments completed, the peasants were given title to the land and although government taxes took much of their new income, the increase in the amount of savings deposited in the land banks and farmers associations indicates that their lot has been greatly improved. Now, more than 85 per cent of the peasants own the land which they work.

Physical evidence to the new prosperity in Taiwan abounds. Taipei, the capital city, is experiencing a building boom that causes the city's skyline to change constantly. Five times as many construction permits were issued in 1965 as in 1961. New department stores (there were none in 1962), theaters and nightclubs attest to a new consumer affluence. Dozens of new apartment buildings are begun each month and the television antenna has become a common sight on the roofs of the new buildings and the old shacks alike. The city is relatively quiet only when *Gunsmoke* or *Combat*, the favorite television programs in Taiwan, are being shown. Kaohsiung, Taiwan's largest port city, is booming and its new duty-free processing zone is attracting large foreign industries. Nor are the farmers excluded from this new prosperity. Even the most remote villages have newly constructed, brick, tile-roofed houses, often built along side a mud-walled, thatched-roof pig pen which formerly served as a family home. Most of the rural Taiwanese have electricity, radios, and some have television. Nowhere in the Far East is the contrast between rural and urban prosperity less apparent.

SOME ECONOMIC STRESSES

There are some stresses and potential dangers which should be noted concerning the economy. Half of the almost 13 million people are under the age of 17. This will surely mean an increasing population problem. It also means that the government must spend a high percentage of its budget on education in order to maintain or improve the present 80 per cent literacy rate. Even more

serious are the demands of the military. Although the military budgets are secret, there is evidence that the maintenance of an army of 600,000 men costs about 80 per cent of the nation's budget, to say nothing of the manpower diverted. Wages are so low in comparison to industrialized countries (per capita income is \$175 per annum) that most of the students who go abroad to study do not return. There is also the danger that the already small plots of land will be further fragmented, making them too small for efficient farming. Some corruption, most notably among the newly rich in their dealings with poorly paid government officials, may weaken the structure of the economy and the strength of the government.

Taiwan's economic success probably can be attributed to a combination of a fertile soil, the availability of a large number of skilled and educated personnel, timely United States aid, and wise economic policy. The government, especially in the past several years, has been willing to give its economic planners a relatively free hand in implementing their plans. The planners have wisely decided to postpone construction of a steel mill, often considered the badge of national greatness by developing nations, in favor of concentrating upon the development of the consumer-oriented light industries.

On November 13, 1965, more than 500,000 people staged a mass rally in front of the presidential office in Taipei to celebrate the centennial of the birth of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The government used the traditional Chinese system of measuring age to steal the march on the Communists who plan a celebration in 1966. Dr. Sun (1866-1925) is revered by both the Nationalists and the Communists as the founder of modern China. President Chiang Kai-shek used the occasion to remind the people of his position as heir to Sun's nationalist government. By perseverance and the default of other non-Communist leaders, Chiang has built a strong claim to this distinction. This was dramatized by the return and capitulation of Thomas Liao, erstwhile leader of a Taiwanese independence movement in Japan, the return and acceptance of

Chiang's leadership by Sun Fo, the son of Sun Yat-sen, and the timely defection from the mainland of Li Hsien-ping, the pilot of a Russian made IL-28 bomber, on the eve of the Sun centennial. The March, 1966, re-election of the 78-year-old President Chiang for a fourth six-year term under the constitution of 1947 merely confirmed Chiang's undisputed leadership.⁴

GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

The Republic of China's formal constitutional structure provides for a separation of powers. Its five branches, or yuans, are the executive yuan, headed by a premier and a cabinet, the legislative yuan, judicial yuan, control yuan and examination yuan. The first three of these yuans resulted from Dr. Sun's observation of the United States government, and the last two are derived from traditional Chinese practice. In addition, there is a national assembly which has the power to amend the constitution and elect the president and vice-president of the republic. The members of the legislative and control yuans and the national assembly delegates were last elected more than 18 years ago on the mainland, but they continue to hold office until such time as the required elections can again be held in the various mainland provinces. According to the "Temporary Provisions" of the constitution and certain judicial interpretations, Generalissimo Chiang has been granted extraordinary powers, and martial law remains in effect although many of the trappings of constitutional government are maintained.

The Kuomintang Party (K.M.T.), with

Chiang as director-general, actually rules Taiwan. It controls the government at the national and at the provincial levels and it directly or indirectly controls the army, the press, and all the important mass organizations. Its overt control of the government was illustrated once again when the new cabinet appointments selected in May, 1966, were announced at the conclusion of a meeting of the central committee of the K.M.T. The present structure of the K.M.T. is patterned after the suggestions of the Communist advisors who helped Sun Yat-sen strengthen the K.M.T. in the 1920's. Party discipline is expected of all members once a policy is adopted. The K.M.T. in Taiwan, however, probably owes its strength more to the political ability of Chiang than to the formal structure of the party.

There are many fluid factions within the party which change according to circumstances. The leadership is sometimes defied, as it was when three ballots were required in a recent election for vice-president of the control yuan before the party-sponsored candidate was finally elected. Almost half the members of the national assembly refused to vote for C. K. Yen, the president's personal choice for vice-president, in the March, 1966, elections in the assembly. The Generalissimo, however, usually has his way although discipline is largely achieved through concessions to the dissident groups rather than by punitive actions.

The suspension of national elections pending the recovery of the mainland leaves a minority (the mainlanders who fled to Taiwan) in control of the island. On all matters of national policy the national government is supreme. As a concession to the Taiwanese, however, the Taiwan provincial government has gradually been granted a wide range of powers in the areas of economic and social affairs. Highly contested elections are held periodically for provincial representatives, magistrates and mayors. The K.M.T. elects a majority in most of these elections but there are some notable exceptions, such as the election of Mayor Henry Kao of Taipei who is not a K.M.T. member.

⁴ Chiang Kai-shek's election was uncontested in the national assembly. He is permitted to continue as president in spite of a third term prohibition in the constitution under the terms of the "Temporary Provisions" of the constitution as amended in 1960. The "Temporary Provisions" device was first adopted on the mainland in 1948. Since that time the government has opposed all amendments to the constitution on the ground that representatives of all the people cannot be heard until the mainland is recovered. In the meantime, however, they have found it expedient to amend the "Temporary Provisions" repeatedly. A copy of the constitution of 1947, together with the "Temporary Provisions" and judicial interpretations, may be found in the appendix to the *China Yearbook*, 1965-66.

A recent change in the "Temporary Provisions" to the constitution provides for an increase in Taiwanese representation to the national elective bodies.

TAIWANESE REACTION

Conflict between the 10 million Taiwan-born people and the 2.5 million mainlanders and their families appears to have been greatly reduced in recent years although memories of the "carpetbagger" excesses of the late 1940's still linger. The Taiwanese will not quickly forget February 28, 1947, when at least 10,000 Taiwanese were killed by the mainland troops in retaliation for anti-government demonstrations. Many of the former landlords, the most vocal class, have now become entrepreneurs in the booming new industries and they seem willing, for the present, to forego political power in return for continued economic gains. The peasants have reaped the benefit of the land reform program and seem content with their newly acquired land. Taiwanese students are allowed in the universities under an examination system which does not identify the birthplace of the candidates. The mainlanders and the Taiwanese are closely linked ethnically and the children from all the provinces are now learning Mandarin in the schools, which will give them all a common dialect. In addition, there has been considerable intermarriage between the two groups.

There are still areas of potential conflict between the two groups. The army is 85 per cent Taiwanese but only about 8 per cent of the officers are Taiwan-born. There are a few Taiwanese generals but none are in key positions. The government regularly appoints only one native cabinet member, usually the minister of the interior. The governor of Taiwan province, who is appointed

by the president, is usually a mainlander. The police department is composed of 80 per cent mainlanders and rumors of "police brutality" are common and often appear in print. The majority of trainees now in the police academy, however, are Taiwanese, either because of a policy change or because of a shortage of mainlander candidates.⁵ While it is doubtful that the majority of the Taiwanese would be willing to risk their lives reconquering the mainland, they do have a stake in protecting the island from Communist invasion. As one observer put it: "What the Taiwanese want is not more mainlanders." A policy of continuing certain concessions to the native Taiwanese, coupled with continued prosperity, may further postpone or eliminate the already fading demands for Taiwanese independence.

A wide range of individual rights are prescribed by the constitution of the Republic of China, but many of these rights have been suspended pending the suppression of the "Communist rebellion." Newspapers are allowed to discuss a wide range of subjects and are free to criticize the government on matters of social and economic policy. There are, however, certain bounds beyond which the prudent publisher does not go. The Generalissimo or his family may not be criticized, nor may the "return-to-the-mainland" policy be attacked. In practice, most editors confine themselves to printing releases from the Central News Agency which officially represents the government and the party.

Freedom of the press is limited by the government's control of newsprint, threat of suspension of publication, or detention of the editors and, more subtly, by control over the financial affairs of the newspapers. Thus, an opposition newspaper such as *Kung Lun Pao*, published by Li Wan-chu, a Taiwanese, became insolvent and was reorganized with an editorial board more sympathetic to the government. The same pattern was followed in the case of the *Wen Hsing* magazine which was critical of the Kuomintang.⁶ Listening to Communist radio broadcasts is forbidden; enforcement is made easier by

⁵ *China Post*, February 1, 1966.

⁶ The December, 1965, issue of *Wen Hsing* contained an attack upon the K.M.T.'s censorship of the press. Suspension of the monthly was announced in the *China Post*, December 29, 1965. The English language papers (*China Post* and *China News*) generally print the same political stories that appear in the Chinese language papers. Most of them have a common source—the official Central News Agency in Taipei.

prohibiting the sale of earphones for transistor radios. A guarantor system makes several individuals responsible for the conduct of each person. Mail is sometimes intercepted, "suspicious" persons are held for days for questioning, and academic freedom is limited. Most of these devices have been limited in application in recent years, but the threat of their potential use is ever present.

THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION

The question of a successor to the Generalissimo is not discussed in public in Taiwan, but it is a common topic of conversation in private. Most predictions are for a smooth transition of power from father to son. Chiang Ching-kuo, the president's eldest son, seems to have consolidated his power since the death of Vice-President Chen Cheng in 1965. Chiang Ching-kuo holds the official post of minister of national defense which puts him in position to control the armed forces. He also controls the police and intelligence apparatus and is a powerful member of the central committee of the ruling party. The recent election of Premier C. K. Yen as vice president puts Yen in position to become the official head of the government upon the death or retirement of President Chiang. Yen, however, has no apparent base of power either in the army or in the party and he is widely regarded as an efficient administrator who is willing to listen to Chiang—father or son. It seems likely, therefore, that the real power would be passed to Chiang Ching-kuo while Yen would be allowed to complete the presidential term. This arrangement has the advantage of avoiding the appearance of the creation of a "Chiang dynasty."

FOREIGN POLICY

The Republic of China's foreign policy is inexorably tied to the "recovery of the mainland" principle. To abandon this policy would be to destroy the justification for the very existence of the present mainlander-controlled government. The government's

official position is that it will one day counter-attack the Communists and the people of the mainland will rise against their oppressors and restore the Nationalist government to all of China. Until that time, the government must defend Taiwan, ready its armed forces, seek non-Communist allies, and maintain its position as the only representative of China in the United Nations.

The United States is committed by the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1955 to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores. The President is also authorized by the joint resolution of the 84th Congress to protect "such related positions" (Quemoy and Matsu) as may "be required in assuring the defense of Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores."⁷ The United States government finds Taiwan useful in "containing" Communist China. The island is strategically located and serves as a useful base. It can easily be defended by the United States Seventh Fleet. Its value to the United States is enhanced by the existence of one of the largest and best equipped non-Communist armies in Asia—one backed by a stable government. But the Nationalist government, committed as it is to an offensive policy, is often frustrated by the restraints placed upon it by the defensive policy of its strongest ally.

Failing to obtain more aggressive support from the United States for its aims, the Nationalist government is probing for other allies among the non-Communist countries of Asia. There have been recent discussions and state visits involving South Korea and South Vietnam. The Nationalist government would like to see the new Asian-Pacific (ASPAC) Council, which met in Seoul in June, 1966, forged into a strong anti-Communist alliance. South Vietnam, South Korea, and the Philippines have similar views but Japan, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia and Thailand are not yet willing to join a formal regional alliance.

The diplomatic strategy best suited to protect the Republic of China's seat in the Security Council of the United Nations is to woo the underdeveloped countries of Africa and South America. After the 47-47 tie vote

⁷ Department of State, "Republic of China," *Background Notes*, April, 1964.

in the 1965 session of the General Assembly over the possible admission of Communist China, the Nationalist government has redoubled its efforts to establish friendly relations with these countries. The most promising method is to offer aid in developing better agricultural methods. Special programs for training of Africans have been established in Taiwan, and farm demonstration teams have been sent to 19 African countries. These teams are well received because they are highly trained and unlike United States agricultural experts they are accustomed to labor-intensive methods of farming.

Foreign ministry officials of the Republic of China have expressed guarded optimism that their position will be improved when the China representation question comes up again in 1966. They point out that the recent coups in Africa have led to the establishment of several new anti-Communist governments. Dahomey is hailed as the first country to recognize the Communist government and then to switch its recognition to the Nationalists. The Communist failure in Indonesia is taken as a hopeful sign. The split between the Communist parties of Russia and China and memories of the 1962 Communist invasion of India may dampen the enthusiasm of Communist China's past United Nations sponsors. Then, too, the continued belligerent posture of the People's Republic may cost it some additional support. In any event, barring a change in United States policy, the Nationalist government expects an increase in support over last year.

Nevertheless, the economic success, the political stability and the favorable prospects for continued Security Council membership have done little to allay the fears of the Nationalist leaders. Their recent actions betray a renewed urgency, a feeling that their recovery of the mainland may be thwarted by events beyond their control. Their apprehension may be explained by the Communist's production of the atomic bomb, the advanced age of those committed to the recovery policy, the seeming failure of the Vietnamese war to lead to a United States-Communist confrontation and the newly enunciated "con-

tainment without isolation" policy of the United States toward Communist China. Their frustration has led to almost desperate attempts to warn the United States against "appeasement" of Communist China. Thus "1200 Chinese scholars" were persuaded to sign a lengthy statement refuting the "China-experts" who testified before the Fulbright committee during the Spring, 1966, session of Congress. United States policymakers are warned against the consequence of a softer line toward Communist China by resolutions of the legislative and control yuans. Numerous government-inspired editorials warn of the "nearsightedness" of United States policy. Madame Chiang Kai-shek's extended tour of the United States may have been inspired by the same insecurity.

In reviewing the success of the government of China on Taiwan, even the "old China hands," made skeptical by Nationalist misrule on the mainland, are impressed by the phenomenal growth of the economy on the island. Inflation and corruption, which cost the government dearly on the mainland in the 1940's, have been greatly reduced in its new setting. The "full dinner pail" of the Taiwanese has made most of the Taiwanese tolerant of their minority mainland rulers. The Taiwanese, who were afforded even less self-government during the 50 years of Japanese rule, may be content to accept continued concessions from the mainlanders, while expecting that the effectiveness of the Nationalist rule will be gradually reduced as the older generation is removed from the scene by natural causes. The Taiwanese, the mainlanders on Taiwan, and the United States government are all agreed upon the necessity

(Continued on page 178)

Mark A. Plummer has made two extensive visits to Taiwan. In 1962, he was a participant in the first summer institute on Chinese civilization held at Tunghai University in Taichung. During the 1965-1966 academic year, he served as a Fulbright visiting lecturer in history at National Taiwan University in Taipei.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Lin Piao on the "People's War"

On September 3, 1965, Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao published an article defining Chinese foreign policy which was printed in all major Chinese newspapers and was released in English by Hsinhua, the official press agency of the People's Republic of China. Excerpts of this article follow:

A full 20 years have elapsed since our victory in the great war of resistance against Japan. After a long period of heroic struggle the Chinese people, under the leadership of the C.C.P. and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, won final victory two decades ago in their war against the Japanese imperialists who had attempted to subjugate China and swallow up all of Asia.

The Chinese people's war of resistance was an important part of the world war against German, Japanese, and Italian fascism. The Chinese people received support from the people and the anti-fascist forces all over the world, and in their turn the Chinese people made an important contribution to victory in the antifascist war as a whole.

Of the innumerable anti-imperialist wars waged by the Chinese people in the past 100 years, the war of resistance against Japan was the first to end in complete victory. It occupies an extremely important place in the annals of war, in the annals of both the revolutionary wars of the Chinese people and the wars of the oppressed nations of the world against imperialist aggression.

The Chinese people's victory in the war of resistance paved the way for their seizure of state power throughout the country. When the Kuomintang reactionaries, backed by the U.S. imperialists, launched a nationwide civil war in 1946, the C.C.P. and Comrade Mao Tse-tung further developed the theory of people's war, led the Chinese people in waging a people's war on a still larger scale, and in the space of a little over three years the great victory of the people's liberation war was won; the rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism in our country ended and the C.P.R. was founded.

The victory of the Chinese people's revolutionary war breached the imperialist front in the east, brought a great change in the world balance of forces, and accelerated the revolutionary movement

among the people of all countries. From then on, the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America entered a new historical period.

Today, the U.S. imperialists are repeating on a worldwide scale the past actions of the Japanese imperialists in China and other parts of Asia. It has become an urgent necessity for the people in many countries to master and use people's war as a weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. In every conceivable way, U.S. imperialism and its lackeys are trying to extinguish the revolutionary flames of people's war. The Khrushchev revisionists, fearing people's war like the plague, are heaping abuse on it. The two are colluding to prevent and sabotage people's war.

We grew from a small and weak to a large and strong force and finally defeated formidable enemies at home and abroad because we carried out the strategy and tactics of people's war. During the eight years of war of resistance against Japan, the people's army led by the C.C.P. fought more than 125,000 engagements with the enemy and put out of action more than 1.7 million Japanese and puppet troops. In the three years of the war of liberation, we put 8 million of the Kuomintang's reactionary troops out of action and won the great victory of the people's revolution.

The Chinese people's war of resistance against Japan was an important part of the antifascist world war. The victory of the antifascist war as a whole was the result of the common struggle of the people of the world. By its participation in the war against Japan at the final stage, the Soviet Army under the leadership of the C.P.S.U. headed by Stalin played a significant part in bringing about the defeat of Japanese imperialism. Great contributions were made by the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, India, Pakistan, Malaya, the Philippines,

Thailand, and certain other Asian countries. The people of the Americas, Oceania, Europe, and Africa also made their contribution.

Under extremely difficult circumstances, the Communist Party of Japan and the revolutionary forces of the Japanese people kept up their valiant and stanch struggle, and played their part in the defeat of Japanese fascism.

The common victory was won by all the peoples, who gave one another support and encouragement. Yet each country was, above all, liberated as a result of its own people's efforts.

The Chinese people enjoyed the support of other peoples in winning both the war of resistance against Japan and the people's liberation war, and yet victory was mainly the result of the Chinese people's own efforts. Certain people assert that China's victory in the war of resistance was due entirely to foreign assistance. This absurd assertion is in tune with that of the Japanese militarists.

The liberation of the masses is accomplished by the masses themselves—this is a basic principle of Marxism-Leninism. Revolution or people's war in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts, there is no other way.

The peoples of the world invariably support each other in their struggles against imperialism and its lackeys. Those countries which have won victory are dutybound to support and aid the peoples who have not yet done so. Nevertheless, foreign aid can only play a supplementary role.

To make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country, and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country, and does not rely on the strength of the masses but leans wholly on foreign aid—even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution—no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won.

War is the product of imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man. Lenin said that "war is always and everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves, by the ruling and oppressing classes." So long as imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man exist, the imperialists and reactionaries will invariably rely on armed force to maintain their reactionary rule and impose war on the oppressed nations and peoples. This is an objective law independent of man's will.

In the world today, all the imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys, without ex-

ception, are strengthening their state machinery, and especially their armed forces. U.S. imperialism, in particular, is carrying out armed aggression and suppression everywhere.

What should the oppressed nations and the oppressed people do in the face of wars of aggression and armed suppression by the imperialists and their lackeys? Should they submit and remain slaves in perpetuity? Or should they rise in resistance and fight for their liberation?

The history of people's war in China and other countries provides conclusive evidence that the growth of the people's revolutionary forces from weak and small beginnings into strong and large forces is a universal law of development of class struggle, a universal law of development of people's war. A people's war inevitably meets with many difficulties, with ups and downs and setbacks in the course of its development, but no force can alter its general trend towards inevitable triumph.

Why can the apparently weak newborn forces always triumph over the decadent forces which appear so powerful. The reason is that truth is on their side and that the masses are on their side, while the reactionary classes are always divorced from the masses and set themselves against the masses.

This has been borne out by the victory of the Chinese revolution, by the history of all revolutions, the whole history of class struggle, and the entire history of mankind.

The imperialists are extremely afraid of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's thesis that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers," and the revisionists are extremely hostile to it. They all oppose and attack this thesis and the Philistines follow suit by ridiculing it. But all this cannot in the least diminish its importance. The light of truth cannot be dimmed by anybody.

Ours is the epoch in which world capitalism and imperialism are heading for their doom and socialism and communism are marching to victory. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the Chinese revolution, but has [some] characteristics of our epoch. The new experience gained in the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries since World War II has provided continuous evidence that Mao Tse-tung's thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world. This is the great international significance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

Since World War II, U.S. imperialism has stepped into the shoes of German, Japanese, and Italian fascism and has been trying to build a great

American empire by dominating and enslaving the whole world. It is actively fostering Japanese and West German militarism as its chief accomplices in unleashing a world war. Like a vicious wolf, it is bullying and enslaving various peoples, plundering their wealth, encroaching upon their countries' sovereignty, and interfering in their internal affairs. It is the most rabid aggressor in human history and the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, independence, and peace cannot but [launch the] spearhead of its struggle against U.S. imperialism.

At present, the main battlefield of the fierce struggle between the people of the world on the one side and U.S. imperialism and its lackeys on the other is the vast area of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the world as a whole, this is the area where the people suffer most from imperialist oppression and where imperialist rule is most vulnerable. Since World War II, revolutionary storms have been rising in this area, and today they have become the most important force directly pounding U.S. imperialism. The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world. The development of this contradiction is promoting the struggle of the people of the whole world against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys.

U.S. imperialism is stronger, but also more vulnerable, than any imperialism of the past. It sets itself against the people of the world, including the people of the United States. Its human, military, material, and financial resources are far from sufficient for the realization of its ambition of dominating the whole world. U.S. imperialism has further weakened itself by occupying so many places in the world, overreaching itself, stretching its fingers out wide and dispersing its strength, with its rear so far away and its supply lines so long.

Everything is divisible, and so is this colossus of U.S. imperialism. It can be split up and defeated. The peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions can destroy it piece by piece, some striking at its head and others at its feet. That is why the greatest fear of U.S. imperialism is that people's wars will be launched in different parts of the world; and particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and why it regards people's war as a mortal danger.

U.S. imperialism relies solely on its nuclear weapons to intimidate people. But those weapons cannot save U.S. imperialism from its doom. Nuclear weapons cannot be used lightly.

Vietnam is the most convincing current example of a victim of aggression defeating U.S. imperialism by a people's war. The United States has made South Vietnam a testing ground for the suppression of people's war. It has carried on this experiment for many years, and everybody can now see that the U.S. aggressors are unable to find a way of coping with people's war. On the other hand, the Vietnamese people have brought the power of people's war into full play in their struggle against the U.S. aggressors. The U.S. aggressors are in danger of being swamped in the people's war in Vietnam. They are deeply worried that their defeat in Vietnam will lead to a chain reaction. They are expanding the war in an attempt to save themselves from defeat. But the more they expand the war, the greater will be the chain reaction. The more they escalate the war, the heavier will be their fall and the more disastrous their defeat. The people in other parts of the world will see still more clearly that U.S. imperialism can be defeated, and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.

History has proved and will go on proving that people's war is the most effective weapon against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. They will take up arms, learn to fight battles and become skilled in waging people war, though they have not done so before. U.S. imperialism, like a mad bull dashing from place to place, will finally be burned to ashes in the blazing fires of the people's wars it has provoked by its own actions.

The Khrushchev revisionists have come to the rescue of U.S. imperialism just when it is most panic-stricken and helpless in its efforts to cope with people's war. Working hand in glove with the U.S. imperialists, they are doing their utmost to spread all kinds of arguments against people's war and, wherever they can, they are scheming to undermine it by overt or covert means.

The fundamental reason why the Khrushchev revisionists are opposed to people's war is that they have no faith in the masses and are afraid of U.S. imperialism, of war, and of revolution. Like all other opportunists, they are blind to the power of the masses and do not believe that the revolutionary people are capable of defeating imperialism. They submit to the nuclear blackmail of the U.S. imperialists and are afraid that, if the oppressed peoples and nations rise up to fight people's wars or the people of socialist countries repulse U.S. imperialist aggression, U.S. imperialism will become incensed, they themselves will become involved,

(Continued on page 180)

BOOK REVIEWS

ON CHINA AND ITS ENVIRONS

COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND FOREIGN TRADE. BY ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 274 pages, appendix, notes, bibliography and index, \$8.50.)

Professor Alexander Eckstein has written a superb account of the complexities of the developing economy of Communist China. Not only does he discuss the relationship between state-owned enterprises and the country's military and foreign policy postures, but also notes the implications for United States policy of a strong and united China whose capacities for independent international actions are likely to be broadened in the foreseeable future.

René Peritz
Indiana State University

CHINESE COMMUNISM. BY ROBERT C. NORTH. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 238 pages, bibliography, maps and index, paperbound, \$2.45.)

Since Chinese Communist ideology is at all times the alpha and omega of Chinese politics and economics, any change in national objectives—pragmatic or conceptual—is immediately reflected in terms of theory. To ask “why theory” is to ask for a history of China and an examination of its most recent expression: Maoism and the mass line. Professor Robert C. North is helpful in this regard for he dissects the rise and fall of Chiang Kai-shek before he examines at some length the strengths and weaknesses of the “ideas” supporting the indigenous Chinese Communist movement.

This book is essentially a primer on recent developments and is no doubt designed as a companion volume to more exhaustive studies about individual aspects of the Chinese scene.

R.P.

I SAW RED CHINA. BY LISA HOBBS. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 217 pages, \$4.95.)

On the basis of a recent Asian trip on an Australian passport, Lisa Hobbs, a staff member of the *San Francisco Examiner*, has written a delightful and surprisingly knowledgeable account of the normal routine of day-to-day life on mainland China. Her sketches and impressions of ordinary Chinese, who neither knew Mao Tse-tung nor ever saw him in person, is likely to give the American reader much food for thought about the China that has come into existence since 1949.

R.P.

THE THIRD CHINA. BY C. P. FITZGERALD. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965. 108 pages, \$2.75.)

There are somewhat more than 13 million overseas Chinese scattered in the eight countries of Southeast Asia. Many of these *Hua Chiao* have become assimilated into the fabric of the individual host nations. Others, either because they have been denied the privileges of citizenship or because of a deliberate policy of discrimination by the dominant communal, religious, or ethnic group in power, have been considered a community apart. In many cases the transient Chinese has abandoned his “Chineseness” by adopting the customs and conventions of another culture, by adopting a new family name, by surrendering his communal affiliations or simply by intermarrying with the indigenous peoples. This complex method of adaption to regional conditions has produced the *Babas* in Malaya, the *Peranakan* in Indonesia, and a significant part of the Thai ruling elite.

Professor FitzGerald, who has written extensively on China and who is currently associated with the Australian National

University, departs radically from this accepted view of the role and position of the Chinese in the South Seas area. He suggests instead that the Chinese are a stateless people who have developed a distinct nationality. Moreover, he says, they represent a single force bound by a strong mystical sense of outgroup cohesion who look to Hong Kong for guidance and inspiration. Presumably this attachment, never explicitly defined, in some fashion binds the millionaire Towkay in Singapore to the petty merchant-trader of Cambodia. The author goes even further in his reasoning by indicating that the innumerable diverse Chinese would inevitably gravitate towards Communist China if given political power.

If the reader is willing to lump the Southeast Asian Chinese into a single, neatly labeled, collective and self-conscious body, he will find much that is relevant in the author's arguments. R.P.

POLICIES TOWARD CHINA: VIEWS FROM SIX CONTINENTS. EDITED BY A. M. HALPERN. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. 493 pages, appendix and index, paperbound, \$3.95.)

The very term "China" evokes images and stereotypes amongst peoples and nations. These, in turn, lead to specific responses by individual countries towards that Asian nation based on differing assessments of a given country's "national interest." The original images are, however, often blurred, based on uncertain information and rarely, if ever, studied systematically. The Council on Foreign Relations is to be highly commended for having published *Policies Toward China* . . . in its "United States and China in World Affairs" series. Now, for the first time, and in a single place, the public is able to examine and note the elements of worldwide national attitudes vis-a-vis China.

Each of the book's seventeen chapters is written by a prominent and knowledgeable specialist and the material, as a whole, has

been carefully edited by A. M. Halpern prior to publication. This volume is indispensable for any real understanding of international views towards contemporary political China. R.P.

AUSTRALIAN POLICIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINA. BY HENRY S. ALBINSKI. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965. 468 pages and index, \$12.50.)

Henry S. Albinski, professor of political science at the Pennsylvania State University, has written a carefully documented, authoritative and balanced work dealing with Australia's relations with China. Relying heavily on archives, interviews, official documents and newspapers of various countries he carefully dissects and restates the Australian government's position on a host of contemporary questions—many of them of great concern to other nations outside of the immediate Sino-Australian equation.

This is a thoroughly professional and dispassionate assessment of the achievements, aspirations and shortcomings of a nation that only too recently has become aware of its ties to the East. R.P.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CHINA. BY A. T. STEELE. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966. 250 pages, appendix and index, paperbound, \$2.45.)

"On the question of China, Americans are caught in a web of circumstance which makes it extremely difficult for them to view the issue with cool objectivity." This statement taken from the concluding comments of the above-mentioned book forms the heart of the dilemma facing the American people. It is simply this: How can a nation develop a pragmatic unbemused attitude towards another nation when the complete historical record of Sino-American diplomatic transactions are clouded by extraordinary emotional issues? Mr. Steele, a correspondent of considerable

repute, has probed by means of interview and poll the current state of American opinion on these and related topics and offers us the results of his research here.

R.P.

COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS. BY HAROLD C. HINTON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966. 506 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.95.)

This book represents the most serious effort to date to provide a comprehensive view of Communist China's foreign policy. As such, it attempts to fill an enormous gap in the literature on the Peking regime.

Hinton's first seven chapters offer background material pointing out the historical roots of current policy, presenting a brief sketch of Maoism as an ideology, and evaluating the instruments of China's foreign policy. The next six chapters examine in considerable detail major crises that have faced the People's Republic in Asia, while the last three chapters take a regional approach to the topic, investigating China's policies vis-a-vis North-east Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia respectively.

On the whole, Mr. Hinton's book is remarkable for its detail and scope and for the richness of its source materials. The weakest part of the work is the author's attempt to interpret Chinese actions, in which he attributes to the Chinese leaders a degree of foresight and consistency of policy which they may wish they had had. On balance, the book constitutes a valuable addition to the rapidly expanding body of literature on Communist China.

Kenneth G. Lieberthal
Columbia University

THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BY VICTOR PURCELL. (Second edition; London: Oxford University Press, 1965. 568 pages, bibliography, tables, maps, appendices and index, \$13.45.)

Victor Purcell has written an excellent reference work on the overseas Chinese

in Southeast Asia. The organization of the text, the bulk of which is devoted to a series of self-contained, country-by-country analyses, greatly facilitates specialized research, and the author's compilation of an immense amount of information is truly outstanding. In addition, the extensive footnoting and annotated bibliography are a scholar's delight. All figures in this edition have been updated to at least 1960, and interpretations have been changed where necessary to take account of events since 1951, when the first edition of this work was published. The book as a whole, although not highly readable, must be regarded as a standard work on the subject.

K.L.

RED CHINA TODAY. BY HUGO PORTISCH. Translated from the German by Heinz von Koschenbahr. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. 375 pages, preface, map, illustrations and index, \$6.95.)

In this detailed account of his first tour through China, Hugo Portisch, the editor-in-chief of the *Vienna Kurier*, has bravely undertaken a most difficult task. He has created a charming, although occasionally naive, journalistic volume; under existing circumstances, this is all he could do. The Great Enigma one yearns to have unfolded relates to the achievements of the Reds in China as opposed to Chinese life under earlier governments, specifically the Kuo-mintang. It would seem that no one who was not very familiar with China twenty or thirty years ago could successfully make such a comparative study today, and the author is no exception.

When he sticks to a description of what he has seen, Mr. Portisch is excellent. It is when he moves to conclusions that he encounters trouble. His book offers little new to the "Old China hand," but will offer the uninitiated an interesting and conscientious accounting of life in China today, to the extent that Mr. Portisch was allowed to view it.

Edward Anderberg

CHINESE REVOLUTION

(Continued from page 133)

restored the power of the Chinese state and had taken great steps on that road to wealth and power which all the reformers and revolutionaries had striven to reach. Before long, in the Korean War, the Chinese people came to believe that they had successfully resisted a threatened invasion—for the first time in more than a century. Historians may not agree, but the important political fact of the present age is that the Chinese people believe it.

It is indeed an irony of China's history that the Communist movement, which opposed and defeated the Nationalist regime, is itself strongly nationalist in inspiration, and owes much of its strength to aroused nationalist feeling. China is strong, and feared, and modernized to the point where it counts in the military calculations of outside powers; these are the achievements of the Communist government, and they win it the widest support. Other policies, such as collectivization of the land, may satisfy some classes, and on the whole meet the need of the peasants. The socialization of commerce and industry is probably much less popular with the former commercial class. The expropriation of the landlords cannot be welcome to those who once owned land. The regimentation of the press—the impossibility of free expression of opposition—is certainly irksome to many educated people. But the mass of the people never had the freedom to criticize and did not have the ability to express themselves in writing. They have lost no freedoms.

Many who are not Communists, nor convinced supporters of the party and all its policies, still claim that the Communist regime has achieved essentials which every other regime failed to achieve, and which no alternative regime can credibly promise. It is this feeling that what has been done and is being done is necessary—even if the way it is done is open to criticism and often harsh—that leads the vast majority to support the present regime. The Chinese people see that

the Communists, after 16 years, have achieved their great goals of reform and revolution; they have restored China's power and, by means of modern development and industrialization, they are also achieving wealth. In time, the Chinese may well decide that the price in ideological conformity to rigid Marxism-Leninism is too high. It is clearly the fear of the aging leadership that the modern generation may develop such beliefs. But as long as the Communist regime can convincingly claim that it alone has restored the strength of the nation and can defend it from further attack or encroachment—a fear which will long persist—the regime will surely retain the support of the people.

"THE OTHER CHINA"

(Continued from page 171)

of defending the island against a Communist invasion. Since the "two Chinas" are divided by 100 miles of the Straits of Taiwan and neither the Communists nor the Nationalists have a substantial navy, an indefinite continuation of the status quo seems the most likely prediction. Revolt against the rulers of "either China," an international conflict involving China, or even some kind of accommodation between the two governments are events which could alter the situation abruptly, but at this time these possibilities seem remote.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

(Continued from page 146)

United States and the ardent promotion of Communist insurrections.

It is disquieting to note that one individual whose power and influence has greatly increased is the military chieftain Lin Piao. He is now a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, de facto head of the powerful military affairs committee of the party, first deputy premier of the government and minister of defense. Until ranks were abolished in 1965, Lin Piao was also a marshal

of the P.L.A. He is the youngest of the top leaders and, since he replaced the purged Marshal P'eng Te-huai in 1959, he has been the party's chief specialist in military affairs. During the last two years his armed forces and their publications have increasingly intervened in the civil affairs of the party and the state. *The Liberation Army Daily* has played a leading role in the purge and "cultural revolution." It was Lin Piao who in September, 1965, signed the important treatise on revolutionary doctrine called, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!"³⁴ It would not be safe to assume that a state in which Lin Piao was playing a leading role would become less militant or less revolutionary. But Lin is also a leading practitioner of Maoist military doctrine and that doctrine is characterized by prudence as well as by aggressiveness.

³⁴ For excerpts of this statement by Lin Piao, see page 172 of this issue.

SINO-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION

(Continued from page 152)

Since then, in spite of more than 400 so-called "serious warnings," Peking has avoided direct Sino-American hostilities, probably because of the great realism with which it estimates American strength. Thus, it is ill-advised to adopt what might be called a "Munich complex" and to equate the present-day Chinese leadership with that of Hitler.

Nor is it wise to overlook the military realities behind Chinese resentment of the American presence in Asia. Peking is well aware of the availability of Taiwan as an American base in the event of a war with China,²⁸ and that the Seventh Fleet is never far from Chinese territorial waters. Elsewhere in Asia, China is surrounded by a ring of bases that helps to explain Peking's somewhat claustrophobic anxiety.

The past record of Chinese foreign policy suggests that China will probably not try

to conquer foreign territory by force. Tibet, long under the suzerainty of Peking, can make few historical claims to actual independence. In the case of India, China has offered impressive legal documentation to support its conception of the border; moreover, Chinese moves towards India have probably been motivated primarily by a desire to humiliate India and to strip from her all claims to the leadership of Asia. On the other hand, a policy of supporting local guerrilla movements, especially those in the pro-Western countries of Africa and Asia, is likely to continue. As the past 17 years show, American boycotts and diplomatic isolation will probably not succeed in changing China's attitude. Instead, the United States faces the far more difficult task of finding a way to help Afro-Asian governments eliminate the deep-rooted discontent that underlies such local rebellions.

STRATEGY FOR THE U.S.

What, then, should the United States actually do about China? In view of the basic factors affecting Sino-American relations, it seems that such suggestions as bilateral exchanges are somewhat beside the point. Instead, it appears that the real heart of the issue is Peking's drive to gain a world status commensurate with China's new strength.

This goal may not be incompatible with American foreign policy aims, for such an adjustment might bring China into the status quo power group. For the present, diplomatic recognition by the United States may be unnecessary; abandoning the economic boycott against China and encouraging the growth of Chinese trade with the West might be helpful first steps. Even though a considerable degree of hostility towards the United States would undoubtedly remain, China would at least become a functioning member of the international community. Only a vested interest in the status quo will bring about a more complacent attitude, and to this end the United States should permit China to take part in a new and more realistic political order, one in which China itself would have a real stake.

²⁸ See, for example, "US Using Taiwan as a Base for War Expansion," *Peking Review*, No. 7 (February 11, 1966), p. 9.

"CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

(Continued from page 139)

negative note. In the present case, the main effort appears to have been aimed at making the less proletarian segments of the population more so, the nonproletarian somewhat proletarian, and the antiproletarian harmless and submissive. This, of course, would make dictatorship of the proletariat more palatable to everyone, a thing extremely beneficial for the revolution.

Fourthly, the leadership directing these events, over and above any question of internal differences, moved to show clearly that change, when it must come, must be in line with established policy and theory, and even mannerisms, and not result from outside, non-dialectical and non-Communist imposition.

In reality, this means that any move at the top level would be (and apparently has been) planned or directed from within the existing leadership, the seven-man directorate of the Central Committee, and its immediate periphery, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. There has been sufficient evidence to suggest that those who rise to the top, barring unforeseen developments, have been and are still being directly raised, influenced, and persuaded by Mao Tse-tung himself—men such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing (for the party post), Lin Piao (for the army), and perhaps Chou En-lai (for the government).¹⁷

¹⁷ It appears that these three will replace the old team of Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, and Liu Shao-ch'i. Teng's leadership over the party delegation to Moscow in 1963 and his occasional role as acting premier since 1963 seem most significant. Lin has become almost more Maoist than Mao himself. The experiences of both appear to be extremely versatile and most relevant to top level leadership. It is the lesser government office that might tolerate some adjustment, say, between Chou En-lai, Ch'en Yi, or P'eng Chen, or even Ch'en Yun.

¹⁸ An observer in Hong Kong has ventured to forecast "another try at a 'great leap forward,'" for which the present "cultural revolution" might be preparing "ideological conditions." He may well have a point. See "The Truth about Red China—How Much of a Threat?" *U. S. News and World Report*, July 4, 1966, p. 40.

Moreover, if the United States is going to be affected by such upheavals, it had better learn to expect more before Mao's China feels fairly satisfied—materially, culturally, diplomatically, and politically.¹⁸ It will take some time before the revolution exhausts its momentum and runs its historic course to the end.

LIN PIAO

(Continued from page 174)

and their fond dream of Soviet-U.S. cooperation to dominate the world will be spoiled.

The struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is now the focus of the struggle of the people of the world against U.S. aggression. The determination of the Chinese people to support and aid the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is unshakable. No matter what U.S. imperialism may do to expand its war adventure, the Chinese people will do everything in their power to support the Vietnamese people until every single one of the U.S. aggressors is driven out of Vietnam.

The U.S. imperialists are now clamoring for another trial of strength with the Chinese people, for another large-scale ground war on the Asian mainland. If they insist on following in the footsteps of the Japanese fascists, well then, they may do so, if they please. The Chinese people definitely have ways of their own for coping with a U.S. imperialist war of aggression. Our methods are no secret. The most important one is still mobilization of the people, reliance on the people, making everyone a soldier and waging a people's war.

We are optimistic about the future of the world. We are confident that the people will bring to an end the epoch of wars in human history. Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out long ago that war, this monster, "will be finally eliminated by the progress of human society, and in the not too distant future, too. But there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war, to oppose counter-revolutionary war with revolutionary war."

All peoples suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression, oppression, and plunder, unite! Hold aloft the just banner of people's war and fight for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democracy, and socialism!

Victory will certainly go to the people of the world!

Long live the victory of people's war!

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of July, 1966, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See also *Nigeria*)

July 24—The six Common Market countries reach “provisional” agreement on major agricultural prices and subsidy arrangements, thus completing 90 per cent of the task of drafting a common agricultural policy for the E.E.C.

July 27—The Common Market nations agree on the joint offer they will make at the forthcoming G.A.T.T. tariff-cutting talks (Kennedy round) on agricultural policy.

International Court of Justice (World Court)

July 18—The Court rules 8 to 7 to dismiss the complaint brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against the apartheid imposed by South Africa on the mandated territory of South-West Africa. The Court dismisses the complaint on the ground that Ethiopia and Liberia lack sufficient legal interest in their claim. The merits of the complaint against racism in the mandated territory have not been considered.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.)

July 21—Meeting in Washington, the Development Assistance Committee agrees to give a more prominent place in committee deliberations from now on to food and agricultural problems; the 15 member-nations supply 90 per cent of the world’s foreign aid.

United Nations

July 21—The Security Council hears a report on Cyprus from Secretary-General U

Thant; he reveals that recent events there “may lead to a dangerous increase in tension.”

July 25—The Security Council meets to discuss conflict on the Syrian-Israeli border; this is the 214th Security Council meeting in 18 years to discuss Arab-Israeli conflict.

July 26—U Thant confers on Vietnam with Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin in Moscow. (See also *Intl, Vietnamese War*.)

July 29—Jordan and Mali ask the Security Council to “condemn” Israel for “wanton aggression” in bombing raids on a Syrian engineering works July 14.

Vietnamese War

July 2—Unnamed sources in Hanoi report that only “one or two civilians, if any” were killed in the U.S. bombing of fuel depots at Hanoi and Haiphong.

July 7—U.S. officials report that North Vietnamese jets have used air-to-air missiles against U.S. aircraft for the first time.

July 8—South Vietnamese Chief-of-State Nguyen Van Thieu calls for the invasion of North Vietnam with ground troops “if it is necessary to end this war.”

July 13—A study made public today by South Vietnam’s minister of information reveals that the number of enemy soldiers and sympathizers defecting to Saigon has almost doubled in 1966; 11,124 are said to have defected in 1965; in the first 6 months of 1966, 9,839 have defected.

July 16—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant asks North Vietnam not to try captured U.S. pilots as war criminals because such a trial might intensify the war.

July 17—North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh orders a partial mobilization.

July 23—An official 11-member committee is appointed by the North Vietnamese gov-

ernment to investigate U.S. war crimes in Vietnam.

Ho Chi Minh answers a cabled query from the U.S. Columbia Broadcasting System; he says there is "no trial in view" for U.S. war prisoners in North Vietnam. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

July 25—South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky says the Communist Chinese are the real enemy in Southeast Asia and that "it is better to face them right now." He calls for an invasion of North Vietnam.

July 28—The North Vietnamese government assures the World Council of Churches that it is following a "humanitarian policy" toward "enemies captured in a war."

July 31—U.S. planes bomb the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam for the second succeeding day; the action is called necessary because North Vietnamese troops are using the area for infiltration; informed sources say the bombing raids will continue.

Warsaw Pact

July 7—Meeting in Bucharest, the Warsaw Pact nations declare they will send "volunteers" to fight in Vietnam if North Vietnam asks for such help.

July 8—The Warsaw Pact nations invite the nations of West Europe to join in a "general European conference for the discussion of questions related to insuring security in Europe." The invitation is published after the close of the 4-day meeting attended by all the pact members except Albania.

ARGENTINA

July 22—The government announces that 117 officials, including 34 ambassadors, have been dismissed or have resigned.

July 28—The central bank asks the commercial banking system to honor drafts on the credit union cooperatives which were closed by the new regime July 11.

July 29—The government confiscates all assets of political parties disbanded after the June 28 military coup.

July 30—The regime takes over the national universities and gives all rectors and deans 2 days to pledge loyalty to the minister of education or resign.

July 31—The government suspends all classes in the national universities and high schools.

AUSTRALIA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

BOLIVIA

July 3—Lieutenant General René Barrientos Ortuño wins the presidency; his Bolivian Revolutionary Front gains a 2-to-1 margin in the cities.

BRAZIL

July 19—President Humberto Castelo Branco promises a new constitution that will increase the power of the president.

July 25—In Recife, three persons are killed by a bomb thrown by a terrorist in a crowd welcoming the presidential candidate of the government's National Renovating Alliance, General Artur Costa e Silva.

CANADA

July 11—Canada and the U.S.S.R. sign an agreement to start air service between Moscow and Montreal.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

July 4—The foreign ministry says the U.S. is making active preparations "for sending its ground forces into Laos."

July 9—The Peking radio reports that Deputy Premier Lu Ting-yi has been replaced as head of the propaganda department of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee.

July 10—*Hsinhua* (Chinese Communist press agency) reports that Chen Po-ta has replaced Lu Ting-yi in his propaganda post.

Foreign Minister Chen Yi says the U.S.S.R. is "making military deployments along the Chinese border in coordination with United States imperialist encirclement of China."

July 18—An editorial in *Jenmin Jih Pao*, Communist party newspaper, declares that "the vast expanse of our country is the rear area of the Vietnamese people."

July 25—All Peking newspapers report that Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung took a much-heralded 65-minute swim in the Yangtze River on July 16 after a period during which Mao was not seen in public.

July 31—*Hsinhua* discloses that senior military figure Hsiao Wangtung has been appointed acting minister of culture in place of Lu Ting-yi; this is the first indication that Lu has lost his ministerial post.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Kinshasa, formerly Leopoldville)

July 24—Premier Leonard Mulamba confers with rebellious Katanganese gendarmes and white mercenaries who mutinied yesterday, apparently over the issue of back pay.

July 28—The government accuses former Premier Moise Tshombe of planning the July 23 revolt. Negotiations to end the revolt continue.

CUBA

July 29—The Havana radio reports that France has agreed to send Cuba \$35 million in heavy agricultural and road-building equipment; deliveries will be completed by 1968. No specific agreement terms are disclosed.

CYPRUS

July 25—The House of Representatives extends the terms of its members and that of President Makarios for 12 months; a house legal committee has reported that conflict on the island precludes the holding of elections. The official terms of office expired last August but the house extended the terms in similar action last July. (See also *Intl. U.N.*)

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

July 1—Joaquín Balaguer is sworn in as presi-

dent and pledges reform and austerity.

July 20—Balaguer asks congress to dissolve the Dominican Sugar Corporation; he proposes that the 12 refineries previously combined in the state-run enterprise should function independently and that the profits should go to the workers.

FRANCE

July 1—French troops are removed from NATO command.

July 2—A spokesman for the Center for Experiments in the Pacific announces the detonation of a French "tactical" atomic bomb southeast of Tahiti.

July 6—It is reported that Jean Saintény, French envoy to Southeast Asia, was received by North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh on July 4.

July 10—Saintény arrives in New Delhi for talks with high-level officials.

July 12—King Savang Vatthana and Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos arrive in Paris for a 3-day visit.

July 13—The cabinet approves a record budget, the equivalent of \$22 billion, for 1967.

July 19—A news agency announces that Air France will begin its flights to Shanghai on September 19.

The first French nuclear bomb dropped from a plane is exploded in the Pacific.

July 21—De Gaulle leaves for Bonn for the semi-annual meeting conducted between the leaders of the two governments.

In Chateauroux, 700 workers who repair planes demonstrate against the closing of a U.S. air base, protesting that its closing endangers an already depressed economy.

July 28—Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville signs a series of agreements with Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Peter on consular, cultural, scientific and technological matters.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

July 1—It is disclosed that in April an East German court sentenced an American girl,

Mary Battle, to 4 years imprisonment for allegedly aiding an East German escape to the West. She was arrested in November, 1965.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

July 2—During a press interview, Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder discloses that his government has sent a message to the Common Market countries proposing a "readiness plan" in preparation for negotiations on Britain's entry into the E.E.C.

July 10—The opposition Social Democratic Party wins 49.47 per cent of the vote in the elections in the important state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The Christian Democratic Union (Chancellor Ludwig Erhard's party) wins 42.77 per cent and the Free Democratic Party wins 7.42 per cent of the vote.

July 14—Three leaders of the Social Democratic Party deliver, by West German mass media, the speeches they would have made in East Germany as part of the debates originally scheduled for today but now canceled.

July 19—The Christian Democrats in North Rhine-Westphalia vote to form a coalition with the Free Democrats, thereby enabling the party to remain in control of that state's government. The Social Democrats claim that this is a "misrepresentation of the will of the voters."

The supreme court rules that the federal government can no longer give subsidies to political parties.

July 21—French President Charles de Gaulle arrives for talks with Erhard. A statement at the end of their meeting announces their mutual willingness to reach an agreement covering French troops remaining in Germany.

July 25—The Christian Democratic-Free Democratic coalition reelects Franz Meyers as chief minister of North Rhine-Westphalia. The coalition government has a majority of two.

GREECE

July 10—Greek farmers in Salonika demonstrating for higher wheat subsidies clash with police.

July 11—The government announces it will outlaw the Communist-controlled Gregory Lambrakis youth organization, which has been officially blamed for inciting the rioting which began after yesterday's demonstrations.

July 21—Greek Communists protest the bill to ban the militant Lambrakis youth organization.

GUATEMALA

July 1—Julio César Méndez Montenegro is sworn in as president and appeals to the guerrillas to lay down their arms.

July 16—Two former police agents tell the University Students Association that 28 students and leftists, arrested in February and March and missing since, were shot and killed by the former military government.

GUYANA

July 30—David Rose is named the first governor general of Guyana.

INDIA

July 4—The government announces that it will supervise the division of the state of Punjab into three linguistic sectors.

July 7—In a nation-wide broadcast, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi urges the co-chairmen of the Geneva conference (Britain and the U.S.S.R.) to meet in an attempt to find an end to the Vietnam war.

July 9—After two days of talks with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo, Mrs. Gandhi announces they reached "broad agreement" on the Vietnam war.

July 10—Hundreds of leftists planning a strike to protest Mrs. Gandhi's economic policies are arrested.

July 12—In Belgrade, Yugoslav President Tito and Mrs. Gandhi issue a joint communique marking the end of their two-day

meeting; it urges peace and expresses concern over the use of force.

July 13—In Moscow, Mrs. Gandhi meets for 3 hours with Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

July 19—At a news conference in New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi confirms a shift in her view of Vietnam, closer to the Soviet view that the bombing must stop before another Geneva conference.

July 28—The government announces that it has received pledges of \$132.8 million in aid from Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands to help finance its import program.

INDONESIA

July 5—The People's Consultative Congress strips Sukarno of his title of President for Life. The congress also forbids him to issue decrees; authorizes Lieutenant General Suharto to form a new cabinet by August 17; and states that the country should return to the United Nations.

July 6—In a speech at the last session of the congress Sukarno disputes Suharto's right to form a cabinet.

July 8—Foreign Minister Adam Malik states that his country will not sign an agreement with Malaysia until after the new cabinet is formed.

July 11—Jakarta radio reports that Indonesia has officially applied for readmission to the International Monetary Fund.

July 22—The government announces that its remaining consular office in Peking will be closed.

July 23—At a meeting in Sukarno's palace, Indonesian leaders agree on a new 30-member cabinet.

July 25—Suharto is named chairman of the presidium of the new cabinet; most of Sukarno's political allies are excluded.

IRAN

July 13—Authoritative sources disclose that the government is giving serious consideration to the purchase of Soviet surface-to-air missiles for defense of the Persian Gulf.

IRAQ

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

July 1—It is reported from Lebanon that there was an unsuccessful coup d'état yesterday.

ISRAEL

July 2—It is reported that Menahem Begin, the leader of Herut, the major opposition party, resigned this week.

July 4—United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren dedicates Israel's memorial to former President John F. Kennedy.

July 11—The Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace is begun in Jerusalem.

July 14—Israeli jets attack an anti-aircraft position and excavation equipment 8 miles inside the Syrian border, reportedly in reprisal for Arab incursions across the border. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

July 15—Foreign Minister Abba Eban announces that Israel will agree to a United Nations proposal for a cease-fire on the Syrian border if Syria will do the same.

July 17—The General Federation of Labor waives the wage increase due to 650,000 trade union members because of the present economic recession.

ITALY

July 29—The country's two socialist parties, the Socialists and Social Democrats, agree to reunify, thereby producing a new party of the moderate left. The plan is to be ratified by the two party congresses in September and October.

JAPAN

July 7—At a dinner in honor of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Tokyo, Premier Eisaku Sato urges Peking to shun isolation.

July 24—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko arrives in Tokyo for an official visit.

July 25—Japan and the U.S.S.R. agree on closer economic ties but cannot reach an accord on the territorial claims Japan has

to North Pacific islands which the Soviet Union has held since World War II.

July 29—Japan and the Soviet Union sign a consular treaty; this is Japan's first consular treaty with a Communist government. The two nations have agreed to hold regular ministerial talks.

July 31—Sato reorganizes his cabinet, leaving the 3 principal economic posts and foreign ministry unchanged.

JORDAN

(See *United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (North)

July 1—The foreign ministry announces that the government will send "volunteers" to Vietnam. This pledge is part of a statement condemning the U.S. bombings of oil depots in North Vietnam.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

July 8—The U.S. and South Korea reach a status-of-forces agreement, to be signed tomorrow. The U.S. recognizes South Korea's right to try U.S. soldiers for off-duty crimes.

The government urges U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who is here for a 2-day visit, to have the U.S. press for a military victory in Vietnam.

MALAWI

July 6—H. Kamuzu Banda is sworn in as the first president of the Republic of Malawi. Malawi is now the 9th republic in the British Commonwealth.

MALAYSIA

July 22—The government announces that it is offering amnesty to the Communist terrorists hiding in the jungle in Sabah and Sarawak (two northern Borneo territories). Most of them are Chinese who have joined the Indonesians in terrorist activities on Malaysia's frontiers.

NETHERLANDS, THE

July 19—Li En-chiu, Communist Chinese charge d'affaires, is expelled because of the mysterious death of a visiting Chinese engineer, Hsu Tzu-tsai. Hsu died in the charge's office after being abducted from a Dutch hospital.

NIGERIA

July 16—Nigeria becomes the first English-speaking African state to acquire associate membership in the E.E.C.

July 29—Mutinous troops in the Nigerian army seize the nation's leader, Major General Johnson T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. Reliable sources report that he is under arrest in western Nigeria. The governor of the western group of provinces, Lieutenant Colonel Adekunle Faguyi, is also being held by the dissident troops. A government statement broadcast by Nigerian radio declares a state of emergency in the area of the mutiny.

July 31—Negotiations, which began yesterday between the military regime and the rebels, continue. The rebels, who oppose plans to eliminate regional divisions to unite Nigeria, still hold Ironsi.

PAKISTAN

July 1—President Mohammad Ayub Khan reports that his June talks with Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai were "fruitful"; he announces that he will send an economic mission to the Soviet Union.

July 7—Pakistan and Rumania sign their first trade agreement; it provides for a balanced exchange of goods.

July 8—It is announced that former Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto will leave the cabinet officially September 1. (See *Pakistan, Current History*, August, 1966, p. 123.)

July 12—Ayub Khan states that Finance Minister Mohammed Shoaib will leave the cabinet August 25, and will return to the World Bank. Nabi Uqaili will replace him.

July 20—Ayub Khan chooses Attorney General Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada to succeed Bhutto as foreign minister.

PHILIPPINES, THE

July 14—President Ferdinand Marcos signs into law a bill authorizing the dispatch of 2,000 combat engineers and security troops to South Vietnam. A \$9-million appropriation is approved to finance the troops.

POLAND

July 19—Hundreds of demonstrators stone the U.S. embassy protesting American policy in Vietnam; this is the third such outburst in 6 weeks.

July 31—The government announces pay and pension increases for 2.5 million workers and price modifications on specific goods.

PORTUGAL

July 9—The criminal court for political affairs convicts 49 members of Jehovah's Witnesses of crimes against the security of the state, for preaching "against the established social order."

July 12—Foreign Minister Alberto Franco Nogueira rejects a United Nations proposal for talks on the Security Council's resolution urging Portugal to grant independence to its African territories.

RHODESIA

July 21—Minister of Finance John Wrathall presents a routine budget to parliament, with only a slight increase in taxation and a small deficit.

July 27—Following a raid by Rhodesian security police, Salisbury's multiracial University College is closed for 4 weeks. Detention orders are served on 9 lecturers and 1 student.

SINGAPORE

July 10—The government imposes strict curbs on the press, banning the publication or dissemination of "protected information" without "official consent."

SOMALI

July 1—At a parade celebrating the 6th anniversary of independence, Soviet military equipment is shown publicly for the first time.

SOUTH AFRICA

July 18—Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd calls the verdict of the World Court a "major victory for South Africa." (See also *Intl, International Court of Justice*.)

SPAIN

July 2—The government has confiscated 7,500 copies of *Madre y Maestra*, a Catholic publication, for criticizing the beating of priests by the police in May.

July 11—It is reported that *Letters to the Spanish People*, a book containing essays on Spain's political future by opponents of the government, is the first book to be banned since the April press law. (See *Spain, Current History*, June, 1966, p. 374.)

SUDAN, THE

July 25—Premier Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub resigns after being defeated in a constituent assembly censure vote of 126 to 30.

July 27—Sayed Sadik al-Mahdi is elected by parliament to replace Mahgoub as premier.

SYRIA

July 19—According to reliable sources, approximately 150 people of right-wing and conservative tendencies have been arrested in the last 2 days. They have been accused of conspiring against the regime.

TUNISIA

July 18—President Habib Bourguiba arrives in Bonn for 4 days of talks.

TURKEY

July 8—President Cevdet Sunay pardons former President Celal Bayar, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes against the state after he was deposed in 1960.

U.S.S.R., THE

July 2—Premier Aleksei Kosygin and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev fly to Rumania for a meeting of the Warsaw Pact. (See also *Intl, Warsaw Pact*.)

July 6—A heavy scientific satellite, Proton 3, is launched; it will measure the radiation belts that will face any manned lunar voyage.

July 9—*Tass*, the official Soviet news agency, reports that the foreign ministry has delivered a note to the American embassy charging that the U.S. bombing of the oil depots in North Vietnam is a violation of the principles of free navigation; that the bombings imperil their merchant ships and crews.

July 11—Soviet athletes refuse to compete with the United States in the annual track and field meet in protest against the bombings.

July 12—Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi arrives for conferences and is greeted by Kosygin and his wife.

July 14—*Tass* denies reports that the U.S. had given the U.S.S.R. advance notice of the oil raids.

Kosygin charges that the U.S. is guilty of "vandalism and barbarism on an international scale" in Vietnam. He ignores Mrs. Gandhi's Vietnam peace plan.

July 16—The government pledges India almost a billion dollars in development loans for the next 5 years. Mrs. Gandhi leaves.

Brezhnev leaves Moscow for a vacation; he will not see British Prime Minister Harold Wilson who arrives today.

July 18—Kosygin rebuffs Wilson's suggestion that the U.S.S.R. intercede with North Vietnam or accept some responsibility for the treatment of the captured U.S. airmen.

July 21—*Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the Soviet youth newspaper, accuses U.S. diplomat Alan Logan of instilling anti-Soviet feeling in foreign students in Moscow.

July 23—In a critical article on the World Court's South African decision, *Izvestia*, the government newspaper, calls for the election of more African, Asian and Communist judges to that court. (See also *Intl, International Court of Justice*.)

July 24—The Central Statistical Board announces an 8 per cent rise in the overall industrial output for the first half of 1966.

July 25—United Nations Secretary-General

U Thant arrives for a 4-day visit.

July 27—Kosygin greets Iraqi Premier Abdel Rahman al-Bazzaz who begins a week's visit.

Kosygin assures U Thant that he wants him to continue as Secretary-General of the U.N.

July 29—U Thant meets with Brezhnev; the Soviet leader reportedly is unyielding on the subject of negotiations on Vietnam.

Gromyko, in Japan, states that Moscow will give "more and more aid" to North Vietnam.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

July 8—Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi arrives for talks with President Gamal Abdel Nasser. (See also *India*.)

July 9—Ford Foundation officials disclose that Egypt will receive a \$488,000 grant to aid in the country's birth control program.

July 12—It is reported that the government has drafted a new penal code which calls for a death penalty for "crimes" that sabotage the economy.

July 23—At an annual military parade, newly supplied Soviet jets, missiles and tanks are displayed concomitant with warnings to Israel.

July 28—The government announces plans for a \$126,500,000 expansion of the Suez Canal so that the canal can accommodate new giant-size oil tankers.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

July 3—Minister of Technology Frank Cousins resigns from Wilson's cabinet in protest over the government's bill on wage restraints which will require labor unions to give the government notice of requests for wage increases.

July 5—Wilson announces a pause in the Rhodesia talks "for further consideration of . . . positions." The talks began in May.

Defense Minister Denis Healey arrives in Singapore to discuss with leaders of that country and Malaysia the future size and deployment of British forces in the area

east of the Suez. He states that the number of troops will be reduced.

July 6—A dissident motion is defeated during a 2-hour closed session of the Labour Party, at which Wilson argued for continuing support of U.S. Vietnam policies in general.

French Premier Georges Pompidou and Wilson begin 3 days of diplomatic talks in London.

July 7—Pompidou warns the government that it must get the British economy in order before Britain can be considered for Common Market entry.

The House of Commons defeats a Conservative motion to pledge unconditional support of the U.S. in Vietnam by a vote of 331 to 230.

July 8—On the last day of Pompidou's visit the two governments give their final approval to the construction of a tunnel underneath the English Channel.

July 14—In an effort to stabilize the pound, the government imposes the tightest credit restrictions in recent history. The principal lending rate, or bank rate, has been raised from 6 to 7 per cent.

July 19—Wilson returns from Moscow after a three-day visit; no progress is made in talks on Vietnam.

Jordan's King Hussein arrives in London for a 9-day state visit.

July 20—In a further attempt to rescue the pound, Wilson cuts private and public spending. His government raises taxes, stiffens the terms on installment buying and limits British travelers to \$140 a year abroad. These moves incur heavy criticism.

July 21—Chancellor of the Exchequer James Callaghan has reportedly told West German Finance Minister Rolf Dohlgrün that Britain will make sizable reductions in her forces in West Germany, unless Bonn can assume 100 per cent of the foreign exchange costs.

July 25—Parliament votes 328 to 247 to nationalize the largest iron and steel companies. The Conservatives promise to do

all within their power to frustrate the measure.

July 27—Deputy Prime Minister George Brown announces that the Labour government has abandoned the goal of a 25 per cent increase in the gross national product by 1970.

July 29—Wilson arrives in Washington; he confers with President Lyndon B. Johnson and warns against further escalation of the war in Vietnam. He also reiterates his government's determination to pursue economic measures necessary to end Britain's economic crisis.

The government demands a 6-month freeze on all wages and severe restraint on prices.

BRITISH TERRITORIES

Barbados

July 1—It is announced that the colony of Barbados will become an independent nation on November 30.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

July 3—Speaking at the 23d annual convention of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), James Farmer, former national director of CORE, reveals that he has withdrawn his proposal for a national literacy drive because the O.E.O. (Office of Economic Opportunity), led by Sargent Shriver, has not provided funds to support the proposal.

July 4—As CORE's convention adjourns, delegates adopt a resolution calling for the creation of "black power" as a new factor in American life. Other resolutions oppose the war in Vietnam and offer support for those resisting the draft because of opposition to the war.

July 5—National guard units quiet crowds after a third night of violence in the Negro section of Omaha, Nebraska. 122 persons have been arrested.

Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, says "black power"

means a racist philosophy that could lead to a "black death."

July 6—Speaking to the 57th annual convention of the N.A.A.C.P., Vice-President Hubert Humphrey attacks racism "of any color" in America.

July 7—In a memorandum to the N.A.A.C.P. convention, Roy Wilkins says that cooperation with civil rights groups advocating black power seems virtually impossible.

July 8—Martin Luther King says the civil rights movement is in danger of a permanent split on the issue of black power.

July 9—Federal Judge William A. Bootle sentences two Ku Klux Klansmen to 10 years in federal prison for violating the civil rights of Lemuel Penn, a Negro educator of whose July, 1964, murder they were acquitted by a Georgia state court jury.

July 15—Illinois Governor Otto Kerner calls out the national guard to help police control rioting in Chicago's West Side Negro section. Gun battles between police and Negro rioters culminate 4 days of disturbance.

July 18—Calling for a national drive to eliminate slum housing, Vice-President Humphrey says that if he had to live in a city ghetto he might "lead a mighty good revolt."

July 19—Ohio Governor James Rhodes calls up the national guard to help quell riots in a Negro section of Cleveland's east side.

July 20—President Lyndon Johnson warns that disorders sparked by Negroes in city slums could jeopardize civil rights gains; he points out that Negroes are in the minority in the 90 per cent white United States.

July 21—An 11-year-old Negro boy is killed and a 3-year-old is critically wounded in a series of incidents during race rioting in Brooklyn's East New York section. Mayor John Lindsay has been conferring with Negro leaders in the area to try to quiet the disorders.

July 22—A federal court rules that federal funds cannot be denied local schools that do not integrate when Negroes choose, under a "freedom of choice" plan, to at-

tend a Negro school. Negro children can not be forced to shift to a white school to achieve racial balance. The case concerns Taylor County, Georgia.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Vietnamese War*)

July 3—In Taiwan, Secretary of State Dean Rusk says the United States will oppose Red China's admission to the U.N. for "years to come."

July 6—The U.S. discloses that it will sign the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The U.N. General Assembly adopted the convention in December, 1965.

July 12—In a major policy statement on China, President Johnson calls for "reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies" in Asia; he affirms his belief that "cooperation, not hostility, is really the way of the future in the 20th century."

July 14—Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt expresses support for U.S. policy in Vietnam, at the close of a 2-day conference with President Johnson in Washington.

July 20—President Johnson proposes to North Vietnam a conference under Red Cross auspices on treatment of all war prisoners.

July 21—It is disclosed by the State Department that the U.S. is holding 19 North Vietnamese sailors as prisoners, instead of turning them over to the South Vietnamese, as has been the usual practice.

Final budget figures indicate that in fiscal 1966 the war in Vietnam cost the U.S. \$5.8 billion.

July 22—Senator J. W. Fulbright (D., Ark.) attacks the "Asian doctrine" of President Johnson, charging that the U.S. "is taking on the role of policeman and provider for all of non-Communist Asia."

July 23—The U.S. denies that the July 7 U.S. air raid on targets near Haiphong endangered Soviet merchant ships.

July 25—The President announces he has accepted with "deep regret" the resigna-

tion of Edwin O. Reischauer as ambassador to Japan.

It is reported from Washington that on July 23 President Johnson received word that North Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh has indicated that North Vietnam does not plan to try the captured American pilots "in the near future." On July 24, the Columbia Broadcasting System received a cable from Ho Chi Minh saying there is "no trial in view."

Government

July 1—The Medicare program—offering free or low-cost hospital care for Americans over 65—goes into effect.

July 2—President Johnson names a 20-member National Advisory Commission on Selective Service to study the Selective Service System and make reform proposals by January 1, 1967.

July 4—The President signs a bill providing that any government decision to withhold records from the public is subject to judicial review. The bill will go into effect one year from now.

July 10—Defense Secretary Robert McNamara reports that, in the first four years of its cost reduction program, his department saved more than \$14 billion.

July 11—McNamara announces that he is ordering a \$1 billion reduction in production of air munitions because production is outpacing use in Vietnam.

July 12—Congress passes a \$17,480,759,000 program for military procurement and for military research and development programs, including a 3.2 per cent across-the-board pay increase for all uniformed personnel (retroactive to July 1) that was not recommended by the Administration.

Congress passes a bill providing a 3.2 per cent across-the-board pay rise for all federal government workers, retroactive to July 1.

July 19—The President signs 4 bills providing increased rights for private citizens in civil litigation against the government.

Labor

July 7—The International Brotherhood of Teamsters elects James R. Hoffa to a five-year term as president of the union and Frank E. Fitzsimmons (Hoffa's choice for a potential successor), as general vice-president. Both candidates are elected by acclamation. Fitzsimmons will replace Hoffa if Hoffa is jailed for current charges of criminal contempt.

July 8—Striking members of the International Association of Machinists shut down operations of five major airlines; American Airlines is the only coast-to-coast airline not struck. The union is demanding a 53-cent-an-hour wage increase and other benefits.

July 28—The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee agrees in principle on legislation giving the President power to order the striking machinists back to work for 3 60-day periods during negotiations to end the strike.

July 29—The President announces settlement (subject to union ratification) of the 22-day-airline strike some 12 hours after he intervened to ask negotiators to reach an agreement. Contract terms are not disclosed.

July 31—The International Association of Machinists announces that its members rejected by a margin of 2½ to 1 the 3-year contract reached by union leaders and the 5 airlines on Friday.

Military

July 29—The wreck of the high altitude U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane missing since yesterday is reported found in west-central Bolivia.

Science and Space

July 5—A 29-ton U.S. satellite, the heaviest ever launched, goes into orbit.

July 14—Radio contact with Surveyor 1 on the moon fails.

July 18—Gemini 10 goes into orbit, manned by Commander John Young (navy) and Major Michael Collins (air force).

July 19—Gemini 10 docks with a target satellite, an unmanned Agena. The Agena rocket is then used to propel Gemini 10 further into space—474 miles.

July 21—Major Michael Collins walks in space from Gemini 10 to the Agena left in space by Gemini 8 in March and retrieves a meteorite detection box.

Gemini 10's two astronauts land safely in the Atlantic Ocean three miles from their target after nearly 71 hours in space.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl, Vietnamese War*)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl, Vietnamese War*)

July 9—Five generals charged with participation in the recent Buddhist campaign against the government are dismissed from the army; 2 are to spend 60 days in prison and 3 are to remain for 60 days under house arrest, by order of a special military tribunal.

July 13—Moderate Buddhist leader Thich Tam Chau says he is taking 2 months sick leave from his leadership of the Unified Buddhist Church; other monks of the Buddhist high council have reportedly asked him to take a positive stand against the government or resign as chairman of the Secular Affairs Institute.

July 14—It is reported that some 700 applicants have filed as candidates for election to the constituent assembly.

July 23—Thich Thien Hoa is appointed by the high council of the Unified Buddhist Church as acting chairman of the Buddhist Secular Affairs Institute, replacing Tam Chau.

July 31—Premier Nguyen Cao Ky announces he will not be a candidate for president in next year's elections; he predicts that Thieu will seek the post.

YUGOSLAVIA

July 1—Aleksandar Rankovic, vice-president and head of the internal affairs committee, is ousted from his top party positions and

resigns as vice-president. Svetislav Stefanovic, a secret police associate of Rankovic's, is also ousted. Rankovic is known to have opposed current economic reforms.

Tito promises to purge the country's Communist leadership of opponents to the party line. The purge is expected to reach all republics, courts, the army and parts of the government.

July 4—The chief of the Croatian Communist Party, Vladimir Bakaric, states that the difficulties faced by the year-old economic reform were due in part to Rankovic.

July 12—Tito accepts an invitation for an official visit to India.

It is disclosed that the purge of Rankovic's associates has reached several industrial enterprises and that Assistant Foreign Secretary Bosko Vidakovic was purged last week.

July 14—The parliament unanimously elects Koca Popovic as vice-president.

A presidential military aide is linked to secret police wire-tapping; a device was reportedly found in Tito's residence.

July 16—The security chief of Belgrade and his assistant are deposed; purged security officials are charged with having close ties to the Soviet secret police organization.

ZAMBIA

July 12—President Kenneth Kaunda threatens to withdraw the country from the British Commonwealth because of Britain's attitude on Rhodesia. He says that Britain must act "firmly."

July 22—The government announces that the country will export limited amounts of copper through Rhodesia again.

July 31—The government announces a 4-year development program valued at \$1.12 billion, to reduce the country's dependence on Rhodesia. The main project is a railway to link Zambia with Tanzania.

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